

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/358491546>

Pro-Democracy Protests in the Kingdom of Eswatini 2018–2019

Chapter · February 2022

DOI: 10.4324/9781003177371-12

CITATIONS

5

READS

292

1 author:



Maxwell Mthembu
University of Eswatini

9 PUBLICATIONS 37 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE



Routledge Contemporary Africa Series

POPULAR PROTEST, POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, AND CHANGE IN AFRICA

Edited by Edalina Rodrigues Sanches



Popular Protest, Political Opportunities, and Change in Africa

This book offers a fresh analysis of third wave popular protests in Africa, shedding light on the complex dynamics between political change and continuity in contemporary Africa.

The book argues that protests are simultaneously products and generators of change in that they are triggered by micro-and-macrosocial changes, but they also have the capacity to transform the nature of politics. By examining the triggers, actors, political opportunities, resources, and framing strategies, the contributors shed light onto tangible (e.g. policy implementation, liberal reforms, political alternation) and intangible (e.g. perceptions, imagination, awareness) forms of change elicited by protests. It reveals the relevant role of African protests as engines of democracy, accountability, and collective knowledge.

Bringing popular protests in authoritarian and democratic settings into discussion, this book will be of interest to scholars of African politics, democracy, and protest movements.

Edalina Rodrigues Sanches is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences – University of Lisbon.

Routledge Contemporary Africa Series

Media and Communication in Nigeria

Conceptual Connections, Crossroads and Constraints

Edited by Bruce Mutsvairo and Nnamdi T Ekeanyanwu

The Zimbabwean Crisis after Mugabe

Multidisciplinary Perspectives

Edited by Tendai Mangena, Oliver Nyambi and Gibson Ncube

Postcolonial Agency in African and African Diasporic Literature and Film

A Study in Globalectics

Lokangaka Losambe

Inequality in Zambia

Edited by Caesar Cheelo, Marja Hinfelaar and Manenga Ndulo

Supermarket Retailing in Africa

Edited by Felix Adamu Nandonde and John L. Stanton

Sexual Humour in Africa

Gender, Jokes and Societal Change

Edited by Ignatius Chukwumah

Combatants in African Conflicts

Professionals, Praetorians, Militias, Insurgents, and Mercenaries

Simon David Taylor

Popular Protest, Political Opportunities, and Change in Africa

Edited by Edalina Rodrigues Sanches

For more information about this series, please visit: <https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Contemporary-Africa/book-series/RCAFR>

Popular Protest, Political Opportunities, and Change in Africa

Edited by Edalina Rodrigues Sanches



Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2022
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2022 selection and editorial matter, Edalina Rodrigues Sanches;
individual chapters, the contributors

The right of Edalina Rodrigues Sanches to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Sanches, Edalina Rodrigues, editor.

Title: Popular protest, political opportunities, and change in Africa / edited by Edalina Rodrigues Sanches.

Other titles: Routledge contemporary Africa series.

Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2022. | Series: Routledge contemporary Africa | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2021051499 (print) | LCCN 2021051500 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032011431 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032011462 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003177371 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Protest movements--Africa--History--21st century. |

Political participation--Africa--History--21st century.

Classification: LCC JQ1879.A15 P666 2022 (print) | LCC JQ1879.A15 (ebook) | DDC 322.4096--dc23/eng/20211019

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2021051499>

LC ebook record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/202105150>

ISBN: 978-1-032-01143-1 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-032-01146-2 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-1-003-17737-1 (ebk)

DOI: [10.4324/9781003177371](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003177371)

Typeset in Goudy
by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.

12 PRO-DEMOCRACY PROTESTS IN THE KINGDOM OF ESWATINI 2018–2019

Maxwell Vusumuzi Mthembu

Introduction

Eswatini (formerly Swaziland) is an absolute monarchy, ruled by King Mswati III (1986–current), who took over from his father, King Sobhuza II (1921–1982). Power is vested in the King and influential ruling elite, who have stakes in the perpetuation of a closed and repressive regime that is known for human rights abuses.¹ The actuation of political parties and civil society is severely constrained not only in law (ban from 1973; and 2008 Suppression of Terrorism Act) but in practice (protesters face high level of repression). Despite facing a very inhospitable political context, groups and citizens have found ways to engage in protest. In the case of Eswatini, trade unions have been the leading protest actors against government policies and advocating for democracy. With a special focus on 2018–2019 protests, this chapter aims to understand the emergence and outcomes of pro-democracy protests in Eswatini.

It is argued that both, organisational resources and political opportunity structures (POS) were important to explain the emergence and the impact of protests in the country. First, trade unions were able to build on their resources and legitimacy to organise and sustain protest. Second, discursive political opportunities (legacies of unions work throughout the 1990s and first decade 2010s) contributed to create resonance with pro-democratic frames. Third, the presence of allies – namely of political parties and international actors – contributed to the creation of further pressure for change. Despite these incentives, protest movements were unable to promote significant political changes. These arguments are demonstrated with the help of a set of qualitative sources – from personal interviews to documentary analysis.

This study is relevant on two accounts. First, only a handful of studies, have focused on protest in autocratic monarchies, which means that a case study on Eswatini can add to blossoming literature. Second, the case of Eswatini reveals the importance of organised actors, in helping keep democratic issues on the public agenda.

The chapter is organised as follows. It starts by presenting a brief literature review on the role of organisations, and political opportunity structures in autocratic regimes with the goal of defining the arguments and framework for the

analysis for Eswatini. Next, the methodology presents the data use in the study to test the arguments presented. The contextual section provides an historical overview of protest in the country, seeking to explore the role of trade unions. The main empirical section focuses on 2018–2019 protests – their emergence and outcomes. The conclusion discusses the main findings and reflects on the main lesson from Eswatini and how it contributes to enlighten the debate on protests in autocratic regimes.

Civil society organisations, resources, and political opportunity structures in monarchic authoritarian regimes

In order for a protest to be fomented there must be several resources, organisation, but also POS (Giuni, 2009; Sanches, 2022). Opportunity “refers to the extent to which power, repression (and facilitation), and opportunity (and threat) provide options for collective action” (Giuni, 2009, p. 362). These are opportunities that arise as a consequence of the political system availing possibilities that challenging groups could use to mobilise effectively (Giuni, 2009). Opportunities may also arise from the cultural context, making certain topics and frames more resonant and salient than others. So some movements may also benefit from discursive opportunities that enhance the reception and legitimacy of their message (Giuni, 2009).

Studies on POS in varying autocratic regimes show that monarchies are generally less hospitable to the existence of civil society organisation and political parties. Whereas patronage is endemic in authoritarian regimes in the form of co-optation and participation in elections (Hultquist et al. 2021), in Eswatini the absence of political parties has resulted in bootlicking and demonising any calls for democratisation from some quarters of the Swati society. Individuals who push the agenda for the maintenance of the status quo are likely to be rewarded with political office by the authorities. This is one of the approaches that ruling elites in authoritarian regimes use to control the electoral process (Hultquist et al. 2021).

Co-optation is evident in authoritarian regimes in the Middle East which is an attempt to minimise any threats to the leadership and guarantee support (Hultquist et al. 2021). Saudi Arabia is one country that has used selective co-optation and repression to ensure stability of the authoritarian regime, which Ertl (2015) refers to as the most stable in the region. Hultquist et al. (2021, p. 217) examine why rulers in authoritarian regimes co-opt ethno minority organisations by focusing on, for instance, the Berber parties in Algeria and Morocco, Shi’ parties in Bahrain, and Palestinian parties in Jordan. Eswatini is a homogenous society where there are no ethnic minorities among the indigenous population which explains why co-optation happens at the level of the individual as opposed to a group. In Eswatini, citizens and trade unionists can participate at their *tinkhundla*² (constituencies) in their individual capacities and be elected in their constituencies. For instance, former SFTU general secretary, Jan Sithole, took part in the 2013 national elections and won. At the time, he was the president of the Swaziland Democratic Party (SWADEPA).

The Kingdom of Eswatini is a case in point to analyse the role of organisations and POS for protest. For many years, ordinary Swati citizens have not enjoyed the freedoms as pronounced in the country's constitution. Political parties were banned by King Sobhuza II shortly after independence, which created a vacuum that permeated politics for over 50 years. The absence of political parties in the country has resulted in unions taking the baton and racing towards political transformation in the kingdom. The political system known as *Tinkhundla* only allows citizens to elect members of Parliament in 59 constituencies and following the promulgation of the Election of Women Members to the House of Assembly Act in 2018, four women MPs were elected by members of the lower House to represent the country's four regions. "Openness of the political system" is restricted to this level.

The nature of co-optation in Eswatini comes in the form of appointment to both Houses of Parliament. Ertl (2015) refers to this legitimation through co-optation which is used by the ruling oligarchy as a survival strategy for the regime. In order to qualify for co-optation one is required to heap praises to the monarchy and acknowledge that the *tinkhundla* system of governance is a system like no other. This narrative guarantees praise singers either an ambassadorial position, appointment into parliament or one of the many advisory committees. The *tinkhundla* system is crafted in such a way that its supporters or their children are rewarded for defending the system. The country is an absolute autocratic monarchy, which means that social movement activity is severely restricted.

The monarchy is a sacred institution to the Swati people that is regarded as a unifier. The country's Constitution of 2005 states that the King is a symbol of unity and eternity of the Swati nation (Swaziland Government, 2005). This has serious connotations to anyone challenging the authority of His Majesty or advocating for democratic reforms in the country. Anyone perceived as fomenting political unrest is labelled as challenging the authority of the King. The King is seen as a symbol and custodian of Swati culture and identity (Simelane, 2016). The King is referred to as the "mouth that tells no lies". An interview I conducted with a former minister of justice in the 1990s summed it all when he said the King can never be blamed for any wrong decision he pronounces, but they as advisors are supposed to take the blame. This augurs well with the assertion that the monarchy is the "mouth that tells no lies".

This is the very reason that has made political parties find it difficult to set an agenda on the role of the monarchy in a democratic dispensation of the Swati society. Political parties are aware that they have to thread carefully when it comes to this institution. As noted by Motsamai (2011, p. 43), the local population see the monarchy as "the embodiment of Swazi identity". However, the monarchy has been losing legitimacy over the years especially because of the extravagance of the royal family in the face of abject poverty experienced by many households. From the 1990s on there has been sporadic dissent against the institution encountering support from across the spectrum of Swati society including the intelligentsia. In 1996, some pro-democracy organisations and non-political organisations declared that;

the institution of the Monarch, revered and respected by the majority of Swazis, should be protected and every effort should be employed to save and rescue it from the hands of cabals and be elevated to a sovereignty position that is above party politics.

(Swazi Solidarity, 1996)

More recently, in June 2021, three MPs questioned the appointment of the country's prime minister by the head of state arguing that he should be elected by the citizens instead of being appointed by the King. Additionally, some local communities have fiercely resisted the imposition of chiefs in the chiefdoms by the King.

In this context, few citizens have access to political power, and any opportunity that presents itself for collective action is grabbed with both hands. However, a major challenge has been fear of the armed forces that have on many occasions been unleashed, on peaceful protesters. Ertl (2015) argues that one of the survival strategies employed by the regime in Saudi Arabia is the use of repression. For instance, Ertl notes that in 2011, following protests that had started in February in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, the regime quashed the uprisings to prevent a groundswell of support in other parts of the country. In June 2021, about 50 pro-democracy protesters and bystanders were killed by the army and the police. In most instances protesters are quashed by the paramilitary wing of the Royal Eswatini Police Service. It could be argued that in the Eswatini context, the political system is closed as such protests take place in an environment which compels the pro-democracy movement to call for transformation through demonstrations.

Focusing on the 2018–2019 protests in Eswatini, this chapter argues, that both organisational resources and POS were important to explain the emergence and the limited impact of protest in the country. First, trade unions were able to build on their resources and legitimacy to organise and sustain protest. Second, discursive political opportunities (legacies of unions work throughout the 1990s and first decade 2010s) contributed to create resonance with pro-democratic frames. Third, the presence of allies – namely of political parties and international actors – contributed to create further pressure for change.

Methodology

The chapter employed a qualitative approach in generating data. A combination of desk top research, in-depth interviews and qualitative content analysis of newspapers was used. The aim is to provide knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon under study (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005), in this case the pro-democracy protests in Eswatini. Qualitative content analysis allows the use texts to identify the themes, discourses, and strategies (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005; Krippendorff, 2004, p. 24) used by protesters, and how the government reacted. The mainstream newspapers under review were the privately-owned *Times of Eswatini* and its weekend editions, *Eswatini News* and *Times Sunday*. The state-owned *Eswatini Observer* was also used for purposes of analysing its content together with the weekend editions, the *Observer on Saturday* and the

Observer on Sunday. The *Times of Eswatini* newspapers enjoy a larger market share by comparison.

The period covered for the chapter was specifically 2018 and 2019. A major challenge though is that the content of the newspapers regarding pro-democracy protests is almost similar in the newspapers. It was rare to have one newspaper not cover protest marches owing to the size and population of the country. What only differs in the newspapers is the placement of the stories which is determined by the editorial staff. However, a majority of the stories on protest marches in the publications were on the front pages of the newspapers, which in itself is agenda-setting.

Trade unions and protests in Eswatini an historical overview

Eswatini attained independence from British rule in September 1968. King Sobhuza II and his party, Imbokodvo National Movement (INM), won all seats in Parliament in the 1967 elections and took control of the government at independence (Baloro, 1994). In the 1972 parliamentary elections, the opposition Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) led by a medical practitioner, Dr Ambrose Zwane, won three out of 24 seats in Parliament (Baloro, 1994). Consequently, the King had to tighten his grip as the opposition began gaining ground. In an attempt to quell the threat from the opposition, King Sobhuza II on 12 April 1973, unilaterally declared a state of emergency (Motsamai, 2011), dissolved Parliament and banned political parties. Political parties in the kingdom remain banned more than 53 years after independence.

The abrogation of the constitution resulted in the consolidation of power by the ruling oligarchy with the aid of traditional chiefs. The King assumed supreme power and all executive, legislative, and judicial powers were vested in him. The King's proclamation also banned trade unions, meetings of a political nature, and demonstrations. The proscription of trade unions was only reversed in the 1980s owing to a pre-existing International Labour Organisation (ILO) agreement which forced the government to rescind the ban and allow trade unions to operate legally in the country (Debly, 2011, p. 20).

In the absence of political parties, the trade union movement filled the void. The protagonists of the struggle for emancipation of the Swati people from the clutches of the royal oligarchy in the trade union movement are the Swaziland National Association of Teachers (SNAT) founded in 1928, Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) (defunct) established in 1973, and the Swaziland Federation of Labour established in 1994. They were later joined by the Swaziland National Association of Civil Servants (SNACS) founded in 1986, which later changed its name to the National Public Service & Allied Workers Union (NAPSAWU) in 2007 and the Swaziland Nurses Association (SNA) now known as the Swaziland Democratic Nurses Union founded in 1965. More recently, the birth of the Trade Union Congress of Swaziland (TUCOSWA) in 2012 reinvigorated the push for democracy in the country which had, at the time, become relatively dormant.

However, TUCOSWA has so far failed to have an impact similar to that enjoyed by the SFTU in the mid-1990s, as later demonstrated.

Public Servants Associations (PSAs) have enjoyed relative autonomy from the government. Even though the government has tried in the past to deal with their leaders it has not succeeded. A major advantage is that these associations have not relied on their employer for sustenance and resources to push the workers' agenda. The unions have put pressure on the government especially because of the massive backing by the membership on numerous issues affecting their membership including the calls for a democratic dispensation in Eswatini.

Pro-democracy protest in the 1990s

Trade unions have played a pivotal role in calling for political reforms and they continue to put pressure for political transformation in the country. Even though this started in the 1970s, the SFTU's two-day general strike on 13–14 March 1995 to press the government to accede to a list of 27 demands which had been put forward in January 1994 was a wake-up call for the government. Although these demands focused mainly on labour related issues, including the reinstatement of dismissed workers, there was also inclusion of political issues. For instance, one of the demands called for the development of a new constitution in the country (Sereo, 2018). The SFTU-led strike had a crippling effect on the economy as billions were lost as was the subsequent strike in January 1996. The vacuum left by the proscription of political parties in the country resulted in the SFTU becoming an advocate for human rights and liberal democracy (Kanduza, 2003) in Eswatini in the 1990s. Debly (2011) argues that the strikes were some form of resistance to the ruling oligarchy's hegemony. The inability to present grievances in a free and open manner resulted in political opportunity which led to the organisation and mobilisation of workers expressing their grievances in Eswatini. Trade unions in the local context cannot be separated from politics, they run parallel if not intertwined. For instance, TUCOSWA's first strategic plan elucidates that the organisation's establishment is to further the struggle for democracy and free trade unions (Hlandze, 2019). When TUCOSWA called for democratic reforms, the government revoked its registration in March 2012 (Wood, Dibben and Klerck, 2013).

The downward spiral in the popularity of the SFTU resulted in efforts to awaken the giant with the formation of yet another trade union, TUCOSWA. The SFTU found itself in a quagmire with its membership as a result of lack of transparency and unaccountability (Simelane, 2007). TUCOSWA was established in 2012 after three powerful trade unions in the country came together under one umbrella body. The three include the Swaziland National Association of Teachers (SNAT), the Swaziland Federation of Labour (SFL) and the SFTU. The inclusion of SNAT in TUCOSWA was a positive development following the former's success in organising and mobilising teachers to push their agenda through mass protests (Sereo, 2018). The formation of TUCOSWA had been set

in motion in 2008 when the three trade unions signed a memorandum of understanding culminating in the establishment of a Labour Coordinating Council, a temporary structure in the quest towards the formation of the federation (Hlandze, 2019).

Prodemocracy protest in the 2000s: The role of (outlawed) parties and trade unions

More recent pro-democracy protests can be divided in two: those led by the outlawed political parties and those led by trade unions. The People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) and its youth wing, the Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO), have been the main protagonists in these protests by banned political parties. Since its formation in July 1993 (Sereo, 2018), PUDEMO has been one of the organisations advocating for democracy in Eswatini. Its overall aim is to attain a multi-party democracy in Eswatini (Sereo, 2018). The People's Manifesto, which PUDEMO adopted in 1996, demanded the creation of a constitutional, multi-party democracy with an elected and accountable government. PUDEMO's youth wing, SWAYOCO was established in 1991 by some students of the University of Eswatini and William Pitcher teacher training college (Sereo, 2018) who were members of PUDEMO. Other parties include the NNLC, the Communist Party of Swaziland, and the Swaziland Democratic Party (SWADEPA), a party that was founded by former secretary general of the SFTU, Jan Sithole.

Protests led by the political formations rarely attract huge crowds. This explains the decision by PUDEMO for instance to "infiltrate" the trade union movement (Sereo, 2018) in order to push the agenda for democratic change in Eswatini. Pro-democracy protests called by the trade unions, on the other hand, have received massive support from workers. The protests by the trade unions are disguised as labour related issues. For instance, the 2018 and 2019 strikes by public servants associations and other similar strikes brought the country to a virtual standstill. Mass protests are permitted only after having been sanctioned by the municipalities and the police.

Pro-democracy protests have concentrated mainly in urban areas especially in the capital city, Mbabane and the second largest city, Manzini. The reason is simple, that is the centre of government activity. In the past, there have been protests in the sugar and citrus plantations in the eastern part of the country. In most instances, these strikes revolve around conditions of service. Simelane (2016) argues that rural dwellers are conspicuous by their absence in the protests. This has impacted the success of the protests because of failure to appeal to the masses in rural areas (Simelane, 2016). He argues that the control of rural areas by the monarchy is more pronounced as chiefs are used to ensconce monarchical control alienating anyone who is promoting democracy. This however is beginning to change as witnessed in June 2021 mass protests which shook even rural areas. According to the 2017 Eswatini Population Census report, 76.2% of the population live in rural areas and the remainder (23.8%) is in the urban areas.

The success of any pro-democracy movement is dependent upon a buy-in by rural dwellers. The concentration of the pro-democracy activities in the urban settings diminishes any chance of success.

The political context behind the 2018–2019 pro-democracy protests

In 2011, Eswatini experienced serious financial challenges. This resulted in the country approaching South Africa for a bail out of about USD 350 million (2.4 billion rand). The country has still not come out of the woods yet following the global recession early in the decade. This crisis led to mass protests in 2011 from the trade union movement but also more recently, between the years 2018 to 2020. The country is going on a downward spiral financially as witnessed by the failure to pay government suppliers, failure to rehabilitate pot-holed riddled roads, and failure to secure medication for the country's health facilities.

The fiscal challenges facing the country have affected government operations. This has also hindered government's ability to grant public servants a cost of living adjustment (COLA). In a press statement in 2019 following a decision by the SNAT to embark on a strike action in September 2019 to force the government to accede to its demands for COLA, government acknowledged that fiscal challenges in 2018 and 2019 have made it impossible for awarding public servants COLA. Despite the spike in inflation government employees' salaries have remained stagnant. Government has also frozen promotions and in some cases employment.

Eswatini has been involved in numerous capital projects which however have been affected by the financial crisis. One such project was the construction of the International Convention Centre (ICC) and a five-star hotel. When the project was launched the estimated cost was USD 66,792,150 (one billion rands) however, the price has sky rocketed to about four times the original cost and still counting. A major bone of contention regarding this project is that nearby there are hotels that are not performing well. One of the Sun International hotels located about 300 metres from the ICC has been closed for more than eight years now. A state-owned hotel that was constructed to accommodate heads of state and government who attended the Smart Partnership Summit in 2004 was also making a loss. The construction of the ICC and the five-star hotel has drawn criticism from many quarters including the pro-democracy movement. This new structure was meant to accommodate heads of state and government at an African Union Summit that Eswatini was expected to host in 2019.

Another protest triggering factor emanates from the lavish lifestyle of the royal family. The royal family's expenditure has been a cause for concern for some time now. The icing on the cake was the purchase of 19 Rolls Royce cars for the king's wives and a fleet of 120 BMWs and motorcycles (Meyer, 2019) which were to be used by the close protection unit. A major challenge is that this expenditure cannot be questioned by anyone. Even parliament dares not debate the royal budget. The arrival of the fleet came at a time when public servants had not

received a cost of living adjustment for three years (Meyer, 2019). As noted by the then American Ambassador to Eswatini, Lisa Peterson, “should the people of Eswatini really be comfortable with such disregard for the perilous fiscal state of the country, particularly with so many of His Majesty’s subjects living below the international poverty line?” (Peterson, 2019). Public tertiary institutions are also struggling to pay suppliers under the current economic climate. Local newspapers simply brushed through the story of the cars without any thorough investigations knowing the repercussions should they investigate further.

The 2018–2019 Pro-democracy protests in Eswatini: Claims and actions

Between 2018 and 2019, there were numerous protests by public service associations and tertiary students. In September 2018, TUCOSWA staged a three-day protest on the eve of the country’s national elections which were scheduled for 21 September 2018. The strike turned violent after the police quashed it for having taken an unauthorised route. The bone of contention it could be argued were the 2018 elections. The trade union movement has been advocating for democratic reforms in the country since it was established in 2012. The national elections were a no party contest, yet TUCOSWA had always advocated for multi-party democracy. During the strike which newspapers referred to as a “Bloody clash”, seven protesters were injured and three arrested (Swazi Observer, 19 September). Despite their assault by the police, the protesters were not relenting. They again took to the streets in their numbers and were later joined by bus conductors. The strike turned ugly as the conductors pelted the police with stones and blocked any vehicles from entering or leaving the second largest city’s bus terminal. The police also detained some TUCOSWA leaders (Swazi Observer, 20 September 2020). The elections provided the trade union movement with an opportunity to mobilise its membership and protest against the banning of multi-party democracy in the country.

The Swaziland National Association of Teachers (SNAT), an affiliate of TUCOSWA which boasted of 11,200 memberships in 2018 had about 6,233 who took part in the exercise to ascertain if the membership wanted to participate in a national strike to pressurise the government to pay COLA. About 99% (6,148) teachers voted to take part in the boycott. After the national elections teachers marched on the American Embassy in Eswatini. They called on the embassy to engage the Royal family of Eswatini on COLA arguing that despite the rate of inflation in 2017 and 2018 which stood at 7.85% and 6.55% respectively, they had not received an increment from their employer. Coincidentally, the King of Eswatini was in the United States of America where he had attended the United Nations General Assembly in New York. During his trip to the United States, His Majesty had the opportunity to meet the US President, Donald Trump. America in Eswatini has always been regarded as the doyen of democracy especially before President Trump took office. It would be folly to assume that COLA was a major factor in the march on the Embassy of the United States. The issue here is about

democracy. The timing of the protest march is of major significance. The leadership had planned the march such that it had a ripple effect while the king was in the United States. It could be argued that they were hell-bent on ensuring that the issues affecting the country, including the lack of democracy take a centre stage during the king's visit.

The march on the US embassy followed protest marches in September 2018. The *Times of Eswatini's* headline read "Bloody Clash" and on the following page it read "Five injured as protesters, police clash" On the same day the *Observer's* headline read: "7 injured, 3 arrested". This strike action had been called by the mother body of unions in Eswatini, TUCOSWA. This strike was on the eve of the 2018 elections which organisations like TUCOSWA call undemocratic because political parties are not allowed to contest elections. The following day the *Eswatini Observer* reported about the detention of the leadership of the organisation. There were clashes between the police and the protesters such that the second largest city in Eswatini left many commuters stranded as the protest action was joined by bus and taxi drivers as well as their assistants. Pro-democracy protesters have felt the might of the Royal Eswatini police when they are unleashed on them. The heavy handedness of the police has in most instances resulted in casualties. Whenever, a protest march has been organised heavy police presence is witnessed.

In May 2018, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (NEHAWU) staged a protest march at the main border with South Africa, the Ngwenya/Oshoek port of entry. This march was on the South African side of the border. The protesters were calling for the unbanning of political parties in Eswatini, the release of political prisoners and the release of Amos Mbedzi (a South African national) who was charged with sedition and terrorism in the country following the explosion of a device that he together with two others had planned to detonate at a bridge close to the Lozitha Royal Palace in 2008. The explosive device exploded prematurely in the car they were traveling in killing two of Mbedzi's accomplices. On the day of the explosion, His Majesty was due to fly to New York to attend the 63rd UN General Assembly (Debly, 2011). In 2012, Mbedzi was sentenced to 85 years imprisonment. The government of Eswatini maintained that Mbedzi is not a politician neither is he an activist as such he could not be referred to as a political prisoner (Nsibande, 2019, p. 3).

In September 2019, the *Times of Eswatini* reported on the call by the SACP, NEHAWU, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) to introduce democracy. This was at another port of entry, between South Africa and Eswatini, in the southern part of the country, Mahamba. Under the headline "Reintroduce democracy", speakers at that gathering noted that though the main issue was labour related it could not be divorced from governance because these issues run parallel (Nsibande, 2019). To rebut this statement, the government spokesperson argued that, "Eswatini is a democratic country where the people freely nominate and vote for their representatives in Parliament". The call by these South African organisations qualifies the argument advanced by Wood,

Dibben and Klerck (2013) that COSATU has over the years been preoccupied with the call for regime change in Eswatini and Zimbabwe.

In August 2019, students of the University of Eswatini went on strike a few days after the commencement of the new academic year. The bone of contention was that they had not received a refund of their caution fee which they had paid the previous academic year. This is the amount students pay at the beginning of the academic year when they register which is not refunded in case a student damages university property. The students' representative councils in all the universities are also members of the Swaziland National Union of Students (SNUS) which is linked to PUDEMO. PUDEMO has "infiltrated" the trade union movement to push its agenda of the democratisation of Eswatini. It is not only the trade union movement that political parties such as PUDEMO have infiltrated but they have also ensured that the students union, SNUS, also pushes their agenda. During elections for students' representative councils in universities and colleges, there is an attempt by members of SNUS, a majority of whom are members of PUDEMO, to ensure that their candidates are elected in the strategic portfolios in the student representative bodies.

Understanding the 2018–2019 Pro-democracy protests: Organisational resources and political opportunity structures

This section presents the factors that incentivised collective actions: trade unions organisational resources, discursive opportunities, and the presence of allies.

Organisational capacity

The SNAT is one union that is well organised structurally in Eswatini. SNAT boasts of 15 branches throughout the country with a membership of approximately 12,200. The organisation has managed to secure assets through membership subscriptions. The Swaziland Democratic Nurses Union (SDNU) which boasts of a membership of about 2,100 also relies on membership fees for sustenance. Even though the unions have survived on subscriptions, the support from international partners has bolstered their initiatives. As noted by the secretary general of SDNU:

Our international partners give us mainly emotional and solidarity support. We do have those that give us financial support mainly for projects that are run by the organization such as the Wellness Centre and the Girl Child Programme. We do receive financial support from regional and global nurses' unions to attend international meetings.

(M. Masangane, 2021, personal communication, 25 June)

In terms of networks the organisations do receive support from other international trade unions. For instance, SNAT does receive support from Education International on numerous issues facing the organisation such as "union bashing". There is also support that comes from the Open Society Initiative for

Southern Africa (OSISA) and the Trade Union Education of Finland, which support the organisation's capacity building programmes and advocacy for injustices. TUCOSWA also relies on a number of trade unions that support educational activities. These include the Confederation of Norwegian Trade Unions, the Confederation of Sweden Trade Unions, and the Solidarity Centre – American Federation of Labour/Congress of Industrial Organisation. TUCOSWA has 19 union affiliates with a total membership of 51,000 across the country.

The availability of resources has enabled the unions to transport members to push their agenda through protest-demonstrations throughout the country. One advantage that unions have had as opposed to the proscribed political parties for instance is that, they have been able to push the narrative of issues affecting heart and soul of the workers whilst synonymously pushing the agenda for democratisation. The secretary general of TUCOSWA stated that:

Human and financial resources are invested for a successful protest action. Protesters are to be transported to the demonstration areas and are fed. For a protest action to be sustained it needs very minimal financial support. The protestors must be pushed by their desire to see the change that they want as opposed to any secondary benefit like stipends. It always works well for us though if we at least transport them. Build up workshops are also fundamental to deal with consciousness.

(MC Gina, 2021, personal communication, 27 June)

Discursive opportunities

Koopmans and Olzak (2004, p. 202) define discursive opportunities as “the aspects of the public discourse that determine a message's chances of diffusion in the public sphere”. Discursive opportunities build on prior trade unions activism over the past thirty years. This has left a legacy of frames and forms of struggle that continue to make pro-democracy claims valid and widely supported. Yet it is important to recognise that public discourse has been hampered by the inaccessibility to the mainstream broadcasting stations which are owned by the state. Unionists are not interviewed on state radio and television; neither their events are broadcast on these stations. Daily and weekly newspapers have however enhanced the diffusion of public discourse of the issues raised by unions within society albeit on a limited scale. This is mainly because such media is not accessible in most parts of the country especially rural areas. The shrinking space in the traditional media has resulted in the use of other channels of communication such as the Internet. Social media platforms have been utilised by unions to disseminate information to their membership. For instance, the secretary general of the Swaziland National Association of Teachers stated that his organisation uses Facebook, Twitter, Telegram, and WhatsApp to communicate to their membership. The introduction of online newspapers has also provided a platform for the teachers' organisation to disseminate information to their membership (S. Dlamini, 2021, personal communication, 18 June).

In the online platforms, the issues that have tended to dominate are the ones discussed under political context. These are controversial issues that broadcasters do not broadcast and newspapers only skirt through so that they do not offend those in the echelons of power especially because they touch on the monarch. The gatekeeping tendencies of the state broadcasters who have a bias towards those in authority has tended to increase citizens' reliance on social media platforms as reliable sources of news despite the challenges associated with fake news. Over the years politicians and members of the royal family who have control over the national radio and television stations have lampooned the call for democracy. Despite radio being the most pervasive medium in the country, trade unions are banned from using national radio neither are journalists employed by these media allowed to cover any pro-democracy protests. The protests in 2018 and 2019 never received coverage on national radio and television despite Section 24 of the Constitution permitting freedom of the press in Eswatini. In 2013, the ministry of information and communication developed guidelines to regulate the operations and activities of the state broadcasters (Hlatshwayo, 2017). These guidelines do not accommodate coverage of any protests or mass meetings called by trade unions. The restrictions imposed on pro-democracy protests are an attempt by government to minimise the groundswell of political dissent in the country. News on strikes and protests is reported by newspapers and privately-owned TV station which have limited reach compared to radio.

Recently, the issue that has dominated the social media space is the construction of the International Convention Centre together with the five-star hotel funded by the taxpayer despite the fact that an operator has still not been identified. With many households living below the poverty line, the argument is, why construct a white elephant that will not benefit the country. The ministry of economic planning and development which is responsible for this project has continued to turn a blind eye to the concerns raised by citizens. The deaf ears in the face of concerns raised result in popular support of the unions' calls for protests. In June 2021, the country experienced pro-democracy protests never witnessed before as citizens called for the election of the prime minister as opposed to his appointment by the king. This call first emerged in parliament when three MPs argued their case over the appointment of the prime minister. This resonated well with the masses including the trade unions and young people hence its popular support.

The critical issue is that the citizens do not enjoy the freedoms as enshrined in the country's constitution. As argued by the secretary general of TUCOSWA,

The Federation is a creature of collectivism. We are opposed to any form of governance that suppresses the right to associate, assembly, and free speech. We believe a system that guarantees all fundamental rights and freedoms, is an ideal one for any society. We believe that recognition of collective political and individual rights should be the way to go. As an organisation founded on association values, we believe political parties can be the means

to achieve political freedoms in the same way that unions defend the interests of workers.

(MC Gina, 2021, personal communication, 27 June)

Despite the availability of social media, the traditional means of communication are still utilised by the unions. For instance, the nurses' union secretary general states that "We communicate with our members through the shop stewards on the shop floor through constitutional structures like, branch meetings, regional General Council, National General Council, mid-term conferences and General Congress" (M. Masangane, 2021, personal communication, 25 June).

As a result, unions have explored and utilised alternative means of communication. The unions alluded to the fact that they do use social media platforms mainly WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter. A major deterrent has been the cost of accessing the Internet in the country, which is relatively high. Consequently, trade unions have to use a multi-pronged approach to communicate to their membership.

The call for change has resonated well with the masses particularly in the urban areas and in the industrial towns. The pro-democracy protests have managed to use frames such as red t-shirts during protest marches. These are colours associated with the working class and the communists. Other frames used by pro-democracy groups are slogans such as "*Phansi ngembuso wetinkhundla, phansi*" (Away with the *tinkhundla* government), "*Phansi ngabo gubhelakwesabo, phansi*" (Away with the greedy leadership, away), "*Phambili ngenzabalazo, phambili*" (Forward with the struggle for liberation, forward)". These have resonated well with the masses. As argued by Starr (2017, p. 1362) "Social movement actors use master frames to present their cause to participants, the media, and other audiences". This gives an idea what the movement is all about and what the ideals for which it stands for (Starr, 2017).

Political allies

There have been alliances between political parties, trade unions, and civil society to challenge the prevailing status quo in Eswatini. The alliances were cultivated on the premise that trade unions were permitted to "freely" assemble yet political parties were not afforded that space. One such party was the PUDEMO, which has forged an alliance with TUCOSWA in an endeavour to foster democratic change in Eswatini (Sereo, 2018). Not only that, PUDEMO and the NNLC played a pivotal role in the formation of the Swaziland Democratic Alliance (SDA) which was "a coalition of trade unions, Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions, political parties and NGOs" (Kanduza, 2003, p. 62). In the South African context, there is a tripartite alliance comprising of the Congress of the South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the ruling African National Congress (ANC), and the South African Communist Party (Wood, Dibben and Klerck, 2013). Though alliances between labour and political parties are common, in

Eswatini, the trade union movement retained its autonomy (Hlandze, 2019). Worth noting is that despite the assertion by Sereo (2018) that political parties, in this case PUDEMO, “infiltrated” the SFTU such that the trade union movement embraced a political agenda, this was also part of the trade union movement’s agenda. It has always been part of their cause which explains why the opposition NNLC won three seats in company towns. PUDEMO needs the trade union movement more than the unions need PUDEMO because on its own the political party cannot mobilise the masses towards political change in Eswatini.

Another trade union that also played a pivotal role in an attempt to bring about democratic reforms in the country was the Swaziland Federation of Labour (SFL). SFL was founded in 1994 following a split from the SFTU. SFL was organised mainly in the finance, retail, and manufacturing sector. SFL focused on worker representation and provided a consistent national platform for its affiliates. Sereo (2018, p. 96) notes that though the SFL was a bit conservative than the SFTU, it also supported the pro-democracy movement. The fact that at its founding congress TUCOSWA made a pronouncement about the repressive and non-democratic system of government in Eswatini meant that they were not going to isolate themselves from the politics of the country (Sereo, 2018). The union also called for the boycott of the 2013 general elections (Sereo, 2018) which are constituency based under the *tinkhundla* system of government.

The International Labour Organization played a pivotal role in ensuring that workers’ rights as well as political rights are respected in the country. The fact that the ILO intervened in the 1980s to ensure that unions are allowed to operate despite the 1973 state of emergency is proof of the role that the organisation has played to ensure the respect of workers’ rights in Eswatini. The trade union movement has continued to ride the crest of support at the annual ILO assembly where they are afforded a platform to present their grievances in full view of the world. The trade union movement of Eswatini has not failed to make meaningful use of this platform.

Conclusion

The intensity and continuity of protests is a sign that as elsewhere in Africa the people of Eswatini are trying to disrupt and induce cracks in the system even in authoritarian contexts. However, the regime is able to offset these pressures albeit temporarily. The leadership in Eswatini has capitalised on the fact that there seem to be minimal support for pro-democracy formations in the rural areas. This short-sightedness threw the country into turmoil in June 2021 when pro-democracy protests erupted throughout Eswatini. The protests followed calls by three members of parliament that the prime minister should be elected by citizens and not appointed by the King as it is constitutionally. About 50 unarmed citizens were brutally murdered by the police, the army, and correctional services officers. During these protests shops were looted and others burnt in the process. The silence of the citizens has been misconstrued as peace. The protests are a culmination of years of misuse of state funds, unaccountability, and abuse

of power by those at the apex of the Swati political hierarchy. When the protests had ended, the King addressed the nation saying everything in Eswatini including citizens belongs to him. He then appointed the 11th prime minister of the country, Cleopas Siphso Dlamini.

The pro-democracy movement has succeeded in setting the agenda by sensitising the masses about the ills in the governance of the country through numerous protests over the years. The opulence of the royal family in the face of abject poverty experienced by many citizens of the country and unemployment has been a major cause for concern which is bound to explode in the near future with dire consequences. The ordinary Swati has since realised that despite the 2005 Constitution, they still remain subjects without enjoying the freedoms enshrined therein. The wheels of democratic change in Eswatini are already in motion, thanks to the pro-democracy movement. The trade union movement has continued to be a torchbearer for change since the proscription of political parties by King Sobhuza II in 1973.

Despite the opportunities available for pro-democracy groups there seems to be light in the horizon. For the first time in many years the king's powers on the appointment of the prime minister are being questioned. The culture of fear which has permeated society such that any discontentment is only in hushed tones in the private sphere is now playing out in the public domain. Many people who dared to criticise the status quo have been ostracised in Eswatini. The impact is also felt by their children who are either denied government scholarships for tertiary education or are denied employment opportunities because of the affiliation of a parent to a pro-democracy movement or political organisation.

As other authoritarian regimes discussed in the book citizens of Angola (Almeida, Sá and Faria, 2022), Uganda (Mutuyaba, 2022), Ethiopia (Dias and Yetena, 2022), or Congo (Polet, 2022), pay a high cost for engaging in protest. However, this case shows that there is an enduring tradition of protest, and that a vibrant and strong organised civil society is pressuring for change. Ultimately, opportunities and structures have helped the inception of protest even if the impact has been limited.

Notes

1. 'SWAZILAND', Available at: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/160146.pdf> (Accessed: 17 January 2021).
2. Tinkhundla is plural for inkhundla. An inkhundla is a grouping of chiefdoms in close proximity. The tinkhundla serve as electoral and development centres.

References

- Almeida, C., Sá, A. and Faria, P.J. (2022) 'We got a taste for protest!' Leadership transition and political opportunities for protest in Angola's resilient authoritarian regime', in Sanches, E.R. (ed.) *Popular Protest, Political Opportunities and Change in Africa*, London: Routledge, pp. 128–145.
- Baloro, J. (1994) 'The development of Swaziland's Constitution: Monarchical responses to modern challenges', *Journal of African Law*, 38(1), pp. 19–34. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/745468> (Accessed: 17 January 2021).

- Debly, T.M. (2011) *Culture and Resistance: Swaziland 1960–2011*. MA. University of New Brunswick. Available at: https://central.bac-lac.gc.ca/.item?id=MR91808&op=pdf&app=Library&oclc_number=912020934 (Accessed: 20 April 2021).
- Dias, A. M, and Yetena, Y.D. (2022) 'Anatomies of protest and the trajectories of the actors at play: Ethiopia 2015–2018', in Sanches, E.R. (ed.) *Popular Protest, Political Opportunities and Change in Africa*, London: Routledge, pp. 181–199.
- Ertl, V. (2015) 'Saudi Arabia's response to the protests in 2011: Analysis of authoritarian regime survival strategies. Available at: https://www.sciencespo.fr/kuwait-program/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/KSP_Paper_Award_Spring_2015_ERTL_Veronika.pdf (Accessed: 17 May 2021).
- Giuni, M. (2009). 'Political opportunities: From Tilly to Tilly', *Swiss Political Sciences Review*, 15(2), pp. 361–368.
- Hultquist, A.S., Birnir, J.K. and Asal, V. (2021) 'The politics of co-optation: Ethnopolitical minority organizations and authoritarian elections in the Middle East', *Ethnopolitics*, 20(2), pp. 216–243. Available at: DOI: [10.1080/17449057.2020.1853916](https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2020.1853916) (Accessed: 10 May 2021).
- Hlandze, S.S. (2019) *Labour unions, political parties and the development of the Swazi Labour Movement 1939-2014*. PhD thesis. University of Zululand.
- Hlatshwayo, V. (2017) *Assessment of media development in Swaziland*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Hsieh, H. and Shannon, S.E. (2005) 'Three approaches to qualitative content analyses. *Qualitative Health Research*, 15(9), pp. 1277–1288. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/7561647_Three_Approaches_to_Qualitative_Content_Analysis (Accessed: 15 December 2020).
- Kanduza, A.M. (2003) 'Intellectuals in Swazi politics', in Dupont-Mkhonza, S.T., Vilakati, J.N. and Mundia, L.S.J. (eds.) *Democracy, Transformation, Conflict and Public Policy in Swaziland*, Kwaluseni: OSSREA Swaziland Chapter, pp. 57–67.
- Krippendorff, K. (2004) *Content Analysis: an introduction to its methodology*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Koopmans, R. and Olzak, S. (2004) 'Discursive opportunities and the evolution of Right-Wing violence in Germany', *American Journal of Sociology*, 110(1), pp. 198–230. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/386271> (Accessed: 23 May 2021).
- Meyer, D. (2019). 'Outrage as Swazi king receives 120 BMWs, 19 Rolls-Royces for his family.' *Times Live*, 8 November. Available at: <https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-11-08-outrage-as-swazi-king-receives-120-bmws-19-rolls-royces-for-his-family/> (Accessed: 11 February 2021).
- Meyer, D.S. and Minkoff, D.C. (2004) 'Conceptualizing political opportunity', *Social Forces*, 82(4), pp. 1457–1492.
- Møller, F.S. (2019). 'How do sources of traditional legitimacy constrain popular uprisings? The case of the Kingdom of Swaziland', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 30(2). Available at: DOI: [10.1080/09592318.2019.1602978](https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2019.1602978) (Accessed: 20 February 2021).
- Motsamai, D. (2011) 'Swaziland: can southern Africa's last absolute monarchy democratise?' *African Security Review*, 20(2), pp. 42–50. Available at: DOI: [10.1080/10246029.2011.594301](https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2011.594301) (Accessed: 11 March 2021).
- Mutyaba, M. (2022) 'From voting to walking: the 2011 walk-to-work protest movement in Uganda', in Sanches, E.R. (ed.) *Popular Protest, Political Opportunities and Change in Africa*, London: Routledge, pp. 163–180.
- Nsibandze, A. (2019). 'Reintroduce democracy', *Times of Eswatini*, 26 September 2019, p. 3.

- Peterson, L. (2019) 'Remarks by Ambassador Lisa Peterson: 2019 Entrepreneur Incubator Graduation Ceremony'. Available at: <https://sz.usembassy.gov/remarks-by-ambassador-lisa-peterson-2019-entrepreneur-incubator-graduation-ceremony/> (Accessed: 21 March 2021).
- Polet, F. (2022) 'How January 2015 protests influenced Joseph Kabila's strategy of "glissement"', in Sanches, E. R. (ed.) *Popular Protest, Political Opportunities and Change in Africa*. London: Routledge, pp. 146–162.
- Sanches, E.R. (2022) 'Introduction: Zooming in on protest and Change in Africa', in Sanches, E.R. (ed.) *Popular Protest, Political Opportunities and Change in Africa*, London: Routledge, pp. 1–18.
- Sanches, E.R. and Lopes, J. (2022) 'Shaking up democracy from below: Protests and change in Cabo Verde', in Sanches, E.R. (ed.) *Popular Protest, Political Opportunities and Change in Africa*, London: Routledge, pp. 19–38.
- Sereo, H.P. (2018) *The contribution of the People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) to democratic change in Swaziland (1983–2013)*. Ph.D Thesis, University of Zululand [online]. Available at: <http://hdl.handle.net/10530/1702> (Accessed: 10 February 2021).
- Simelane, H.S. (2016) 'Fiscal crisis, social protest and state violence in Swaziland, 2009–2012', *Southern Journal for Contemporary History* 41(2), pp. 208–228. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.18820/24150509/JCH41.v2.11> (Accessed: 20 March 2021).
- Simelane, X. (2007) *The making of Swazi working class: Challenges to the emergence of countermovement in Swaziland*. MA Dissertation, Wits University [online]. Available at: <http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/5774/DISSERTATION.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y> (Accessed: 22 March 2021).
- Starr, C. (2017) 'When culture matters: Frame resonance and protests against femicide in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico', *The Qualitative Report*, 22(5), pp. 1359–1378. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.46743/2160-3715/2017.2967> (Accessed: 20 May 2021).
- Swaziland Government (2005) *Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland*. Mbabane: Government Printer.
- Swazi Solidarity (1996). *The Kwaluseni Declaration*. Available at: <http://pudemo.blogspot.com/1996/03/> (Accessed: 14 February 2021).
- Wood, G., Dibben, P. and Klerck, G. (2013) 'The limits of transnational solidarity: The Congress of South African Trade Unions and the Swaziland and Zimbabwean crises', *Labor History*, 54(5), pp. 527–539. Available at: DOI: [10.1080/0023656X.2013.849925](https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2013.849925) (Accessed: 30 March 2021).