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## Counterinsurgent Warfare and the Decentering of Sovereignty in Somalia

*Louise Wiuff Moe*

During the 2000s, Somalia gained the reputation as the ‘longest-running instance of complete state collapse in postcolonial history’ (Menkhaus 2006: 74). With its record of warlordism, piracy, and militant Islamism, following from state collapse, Somalia became a key reference point in policy assessments of global threat and insecurity scenarios. In 2011, for instance, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton justified the intervention into Libya as an action aimed at preventing the country from developing into ‘a giant Somalia’ (Washington Post 2011), while in 2014 United Nations (UN) envoy Lakhdar Brahimi warned that international action was urgently required to prevent Syria from becoming ‘another Somalia’ (Der Spiegel 2014; see also Reno 2015). This dovetails with US President George W. Bush’s announcement in the 2002 National Security Strategy that ‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones’.

What has received less attention in analyses on Somalia, however, is how the country in contemporary security policy discourse is conceived of not merely as the exemplary case of ‘global threats’ or the ‘the world’s foremost

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L.W. Moe (✉)

Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark

graveyard' of foreign policy in regards to state-based stabilization and security efforts (Menkhaus 2006: 74). During the latter half of the 2000s, Somalia has also come to be conceived of as a key showcase for reworked security approaches, including counterinsurgency efforts, adapting to state fragility by moving beyond linear hierarchical state-centric forms of stabilization.

In 2013, for instance, the United States Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Michael Sheehan (DoD News 2013), cited Somalia and the counterinsurgency efforts against the Somali Islamist movement al Shabaab as a key case in regards to demonstrating the success of the new 'innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches' (DoD 2012: 3, quoted in DoD 2013) called for in the US Defense Strategy released in early 2012. As he argued: 'You can see in our strategies, our policies and programs in Yemen and Somalia, some of the components of how our strategy might look in the months and years ahead' (DoD 2013). Similarly, addressing the progress made in the fight against al Shabaab since 2011, the retiring Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, celebrated in his valedictory speech how the 'seemingly hopeless' conflict in Somalia has been transformed 'into a major success story and a potential model for the resolution of other conflicts on the continent' (DoS 2013). These judgments were reiterated in 2014 by President Barack Obama in his assessment that Somalia displays something of a new model for fighting insurgencies and terrorism (The White House 2014). While recently challenged by critics (e.g. see Homeland Security News Wire 2015; Washington Post 2015), these accounts indicate how the apparent rapid weakening of al Shabaab from 2011 'made it fashionable within political and military circles to cite the "Somalia model" as a prescription for other conflicts in Africa' (Pham 2013: 2).

This notion of the 'small-footprint' 'Somalia model' for addressing insurgencies corresponds to a rereading, offered by contemporary counterinsurgency analysts, of the basic conditions for political (dis)order in Somalia. Whereas the lack of functioning state institutions and the rise of non- and sub-state governance arrangements have commonly been portrayed as obstacles to international intervention schemes as well as a fertile breeding ground for insurgencies, contemporary counterinsurgency analysis instead highlights that such decentered forms of non-state authority actually offer the 'solution' to security threats emanating from 'fragile' or 'failing' states because they constitute key potential building blocks for effectively fighting insurgencies:

Among the lessons [...] drawn, which are applicable to other insurgency [...] situations in Africa, is that the repeated failure of internationally-backed

attempts to reestablish a national government in Somalia underscores the limitations of top-down, state-centric processes that are structurally engineered with a bias in favor of centralization, rather than bottom-up, community-based approaches better adapted to the local sensibilities. (Pham 2013: x)

This echoes counterinsurgency theorist Kilcullen's assessment (2010: 156) that 'Somalia is virtually a laboratory test case' demonstrating 'completely different results arising from a bottom-up peace-building process based on local-level rule of law versus a top-down approach based on putting in place a "grand bargain" at the elite level'. With this discovery of 'the local', incorporated directly into analyses of how to improve the effectiveness of counterinsurgent warfare, such warfare is rearticulated through contemporary peacebuilding and 'bottom-up governance discourses' (see also Moe 2015, 2016; Turner this volume). Thereby non-state actors can be engaged and recognized on the same level as governments and state actors in regards to their security capacities (see *JP 3-24*:1-5, see also Moe and Müller this volume).

The present chapter analyses the implications of this 'test case' approach of recognizing the 'Somalia model' that 'works bottom up' (Pham 2013: 27) as a key means of counterinsurgency warfare in terms of its productive effects. In doing so, the chapter moves beyond the representation of interventionary counterinsurgency as simply adapting to and engaging '*existing* local structures' (*JP 3-24*, emphasis added) by highlighting the role of counterinsurgent warfare in Somalia in *producing* and consolidating new counterinsurgent polities.

The productive order-making effects of counterinsurgency in the 'test case' of Somalia are paradigmatically illustrated in the case of Jubaland, a polity that was recently established in the aftermath of one of the key counterinsurgency efforts against al Shabaab in the southern Lower Juba region. The case offers an ideal entry point from which to examine new counterinsurgency-related governing logics that have emerged in a context where pressures from local and international demands far outweigh the capacity of the central state, while decentralized security arrangements have multiplied.

The chapter examines how these logics, and the ensuing production of counterinsurgent local polities, operate through what I term a 'decentering of sovereignty'. This unfolds as mutually reinforcing processes, with practical, discursive, and performative dimensions: First, sovereignty is rescaled in practice as non-state actors are enlisted in counterinsurgent

warfare whereby they are empowered with coercive resources and means to inflict lethal violence. Second, this feeds into and requires legitimizing discursive redefinitions of sovereignty, which emphasize “‘not objective’ measures of legality and rationality” (Egnell 2013: 221) but ‘bottom-up government’ adapted to ‘the decentralized nature of Somali society’ (Pham 2013: 54; see also Freear 2012; Egnell 2013) as the most suited and legitimate entry point for counterinsurgency. Third, this, in turn, is matched by symbolic performances and mimicry of ‘stateness’ and sovereignty on sub-national levels by non-state actors seeking influence and international acknowledgment. As such, these processes follow a post-Westphalian logic whereby new (decentered) sovereignties are produced through the presence of, rather than the barring of, external interveners (see Krasner 1999: 4; Lawson and Rotchild 2005).

The following section situates the case of counterinsurgent warfare in the Juba region against the wider backdrop of securitization of interventions in Somalia, the gradual international recognition of the limitations of conventional counterterrorism and stabilization efforts as well as the recent adaptations toward more adaptive and decentered counterinsurgency approaches. In elaborating the analysis of counterinsurgent warfare as a productive force that creates new, local, quasi-sovereign orders, the subsequent sections turn to the case of Jubaland. Firstly, the analysis attends to the way in which the discursive representation of ‘locally anchored’ counterinsurgency, operating through a ‘decentering of sovereignty’, provided a shared frame and opportunity for both local, regional and international actors to each pursue very different interests while collectively reinforcing the common legitimizing frame. Secondly, the chapter discusses the performative aspects involved in enacting and thereby ‘producing’ a ‘local’ counterinsurgent polity—the Jubaland administration—and rendering it legible as an ally in wider regional and international counterinsurgency networks. This is elaborated by, thirdly, discussing the transition from counterinsurgency-driven interventions against al Shabaab to the post-interventionary counterinsurgent ‘long war’, configured around political economy as well as regional, international and transnational strategies of security governance and economic profiteering. These strategies involve alliances with local partners in Jubaland, who, in turn, become integrated into new international and transnational security networks that provide them with access to new coercive resources. This demonstrates the continuing, productive, order-making effects—cutting across local, regional,

international, and transnational divides—revolving around processes of ‘decentering sovereignty’ as part of the ‘local turn’ in counterinsurgent warfare in Somalia.

### ‘BRAVE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS’ OF THE LIMITATIONS OF CONVENTIONAL MILITARY AND STATE-CENTRIC APPROACHES

Since 2001, international engagements in the eastern Horn of Africa have been greatly securitized with an increasing focus on capacities for responding to security threats considered to emanate from al Qaeda and related extremist movements, especially the Somali-based al Shabaab (Hammond and Vaughan-Lee 2012; Menkhaus 2014). As a result, the range of intervening actors has expanded to include various private security contractors, peace-keeping missions and external militaries (Menkhaus 2014). The latter includes, for instance, the US-backed Ethiopian military invasion aimed at ousting the Union of Islamic Courts in 2006, and the launch of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007.

Yet, as has been the case in other theaters of the global war on terror (GWOT, see Erslev Andersen this volume), a narrow focus on military planning and hierarchical state-based stabilization did not yield the desired results. The top-down military invasion against the Union of Islamic Courts exacerbated the radicalism it ostensibly set out to combat and demonstrated the limits of narrow military strategy employed by external armies. Possibilities for effective international engagements with and through the Transitional Federal Government (TFG, 2004–2012), and its successor, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), have generally been undercut by a combination of corruption, political infighting and very limited government capacity to exercise any meaningful territorial control. AMISOM, in turn, grew increasingly unpopular during the 2000s due to its coercive and inflexible structure as, essentially, a counterterrorism force. In response to such context-specific limitations of conventional and state-centric security and counterterrorism approaches and to wider critiques of the GWOT, a gradual reworking of security interventions has been underway from the mid-2000s. AMISOM, for instance, has, since 2011, been refashioned as not just a military force but also a facilitator of dialogue, reconciliation, community policing initiatives, and so on,<sup>1</sup> as well as a flexible umbrella structure for local, regional, and international

cooperation, allegedly representing ‘a new networked pattern in the international security architecture’ based on the lesson learned that ‘the way to cope with [...] complexity is to continuously adapt to it’ (Freear and De Coning 2013: 2–4).<sup>2</sup>

Aligning with this emphasis on adaptability—and the notion of Somalia as a ‘laboratory test case’ for ‘bottom-up’ approaches—there has been a growing international interest in more systematic engagement with and incorporation of the localized authorities and polities that have multiplied across Somalia into intervention approaches. While this has been framed as a ‘parallel sphere of recognition’ (Reno 2015) alongside ongoing official statebuilding schemes, such logics are actually increasingly integrated as elements into—rather than working ‘in parallel with’—the intervention approaches of key official intervention actors (see Moe 2015, 2016). Important to note, however, adaptive decentered and non-linear counterinsurgency approaches have far from replaced conventional stabilization, statebuilding, and counterterrorism efforts. Rather, the former have emerged in conjunction with, and in response to the limits of, the latter.

The focus on localized, ‘non-state’ sovereignties and ‘alternative’ governance arrangements in Somalia has been central to the academic critiques of Western- and state-centrism, and to the peacebuilding discourses. That being said, the extent to which such focus has come to inform policy implementation in the domain of counterinsurgent warfare remains largely uncharted. In basic terms, localized sub- and non-state actors simply represent alternative, tenable, entry points for implementing counterinsurgency in the context of deeply fragmented and contested state authority. This condition of a ‘fragile state’ with ‘resilient’ localized governance arrangements ‘argues for’, the Center for Preventive Action notes, ‘a decentralized approach [...] that works with existing local authorities and does not seek to build formal institutions’ (Bruton 2010: viii). This illustrates the expansion of counterinsurgency beyond the limited outreach of state actors, the legitimation of such engagement, and the decentering of sovereignty through ‘bottom-up’ discourses. A key case in point is the dual track policy for Somalia, formulated by the US in 2010,<sup>3</sup> in essence a flexible counterinsurgency scheme represented as an approach aimed at facilitating and building ‘bottom-up post-al Shabaab governance’ (Freear 2012; see also DoS 2010). While ‘track one’ maintains the support for statebuilding and the official ‘big players’, including AMISOM, the TFG and its successor, the FGS, ‘track two’ formulates a policy allegedly ‘more flexible and adaptive to local needs’ (DoS 2010).

The latter aims at supporting non-state actors and institutions, including, clans, elders, and militia groups ‘as well as local and regional administrative units, throughout South Central Somalia, who are opposed to Al Shabaab’ (DoS 2010). Such counterinsurgency policy, targeting and, in effect, producing decentral, quasi-sovereign, counterinsurgent structures and institutions has been represented as a ‘brave acknowledgement’ of the evident limitations of a narrow prioritization of Western top-down stabilization approaches, and as a recognition of the resilience and security achievements led by local authorities ‘of a country culturally adapted to diffuse power’ (Freear 2012; see also Pham 2013).

This enables international and regional actors to flexibly navigate and enlist local, often fragmented and mutable, sub- and non-state forces and institutions in the context of open-ended civil war in the south of Somalia. In several instances in the past, intervention actors have also responded to alleged terrorist threats by allying with sub-state polities, warlords, clan-militias, faction leaders, and former military officials (e.g. see ICG 2005). However, with the formulation of dual track policies, such engagements can be reframed, from sporadic and shadowy proxy combat, operating in parallel with ‘official politics’, to ‘bottom-up’ governance, statebuilding and stabilization (Moe 2015, 2016). The Jubaland administration, which was established after the defeat of al Shabaab in the port city of Kismayo in lower Juba in 2012, has been fashioned as ‘the latest, and most significant, test of how to apply the difficult realities of the dual track to Somalia’ and thereby also ‘meet agreed critical national [US] security interests’ (Freear 2012). As such, the case demonstrates in further detail different key aspects of the role of contemporary counterinsurgent warfare in not only engaging but also producing local quasi-sovereign counterinsurgent polities.

#### DECENTERING SOVEREIGNTY: A SHARED OPPORTUNITY FOR COUNTERINSURGENT ALLIES IN THE CASE OF JUBALAND

The 2012 defeat of al Shabaab in the port city of Kismayo in the southern lower Juba region is seen as one of the major advances against the movement due to the fact that the city is an economic hub in southern Somalia and was one of the strongholds and key sources of income for al Shabaab. The forces that ousted al Shabaab, while all officially operat-

ing under AMISOM, were involved in a complex set of alliances. The two main fronts allying against al Shabaab were, on the one hand, the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF), which supported and fought alongside the Ogaden clan militia Muaskar Ras Kamboni (MRK) (which previously ruled Juba), and, on the other hand, militias of the Marehan clan mobilized by the FGS and supported by Ethiopia.

These local, regional, and international actors each pursued their different, even competing, interests while simultaneously reinforcing a common frame of ‘bottom-up African- led counterinsurgency’ operating with shared ‘rules of the game’ based on the common understanding of the opportunity offered by ‘decentering sovereignty’—that is to say, in practice adapting to and producing local ‘non-state’ actors and institutions with new coercive means. As discussed below, this illustrates the ways in which counterinsurgency’s ‘local turn’ is not only an emerging international discourse but also is acted upon and appropriated as part of regional and local attempts of gaining power and influence, thereby generating a wider ‘security field’ in which new powers and polities are produced in the context of extreme state fragility. Accordingly, Somalia is not just a ‘laboratory’ within which external counterinsurgency actors try out new policies and strategies ‘upon’ local settings, it is also a place where these new policies and strategies are being transformed by local agency and through local, regional, and global relationships and interactions.

Already in 2009, an alliance began to form between the Kenyan government and sub-clans and local elites living in the Somali Juba regions due to the interest of both parties in ousting al Shabaab from Juba and, specifically, from the port city of Kismayo. Resistance to al Shabaab had been growing locally, with different groups across Somalia organizing against the movement. Kenya’s motivations, in turn, were driven both by security concerns and by economic interests. Jubaland (comprising Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba) borders Kenya, and ousting al Shabaab from the area was therefore an obvious security objective. While Kenya had developed increasing confidence as an emerging East African power, it still needed regional combat experience, especially as the country had been under international (particularly US) pressure to demonstrate ‘action’ against regional insurgency threats and terrorism (Prestholdt 2011). These incentives became coupled with the more long-term perspective of establishing borderland authorities with benign relations to Kenya once the area had been liberated from al Shabaab. Supporting the rise of new decentered authority structures in Jubaland was envisioned by

Kenya as a way to create a buffer zone against attacks from al Shabaab and for securing Kenyan access to the prosperous port of Kismayo as well as its influence over gas and oil resources in the contested coastal waters (ICG 2013; Anderson and Gundel 2013). To achieve this strategic security-economic objective, and to establish the alliance against al Shabaab, the KDF started training Somali militias from the Kenyan-Somali border regions.

The FGS, Ethiopia, the US, and other Western powers were initially apprehensive about this approach, which nonetheless gradually gained support as it could be sold as ‘a good fit with the US government’s dual track policy and as a step toward creating ‘local security and stabilisation in the absence of a strong central state’ (ICG 2013: 3). The initiative also promised an ‘optimal counterterrorism outcome’, the ousting of al Shabaab from Kismayo, for both regional and international actors involved (Menkhaus 2012; see also ICG 2013). After the KDF was deployed in Somalia in October 2011,<sup>4</sup> a wider counterinsurgent alliance aimed at defeating al Shabaab in Kismayo by enlisting and empowering local strongmen in the region—thereby providing them core aspects of sovereignty, namely the means of lethal violence—started to gradually consolidate.

In December 2011, Kenya succeeded in getting support to have its forces in Somalia “re-hatted” as AMISOM peacekeepers’ (Menkhaus 2012: 6). In this way, Kenya’s counterinsurgency campaign officially became part of a wider UN-mandated international peacebuilding engagement. It could thereby draw on the apparent legitimacy and authority of AMISOM while benefiting from financial support from wealthy nations and international actors (including the European Union, UK, US, etc.), who, in turn, could avoid official ‘boots on the ground’ and instead pursue an approach of indirectly ‘empowering indigenous local and regional forces’ (Bruton and Williams 2014: 4). Under the flexible and rather fluid AMISOM framework, Kenya provided both military and political support to the Ogaden militia Muaskar Ras Kamboni. The then Kenyan minister of defense himself belongs to the Ogaden clan, and Kenya and the MRK, headed by militia leader Ahmed Mohamed Islam (known as Madobe), had reached common ground regarding the project of creating and ruling a Jubaland polity after defeating al Shabaab. Madobe was, additionally, a local ally considered to know the terrain well and be able to offer insider knowledge as he was a former al Shabaab affiliate. The alliance with Kenya, in turn, allowed the MRK leadership to significantly expand its coercive capacity and infrastructure, thereby allowing, as will

be expanded upon below, for steering the direction of new order-making processes in Jubaland.

Sharing the goal to oust al Shabaab, and buying into the counterinsurgent tactic of ‘locally anchored’ approaches, while also aiming to counter-balance Kenyan and Ogaden influence<sup>5</sup>, the FGS and Ethiopia opted for supporting the Marehan-clan militias led by former warlord Barre Adan Shire ‘Hiiraale’. Hiiraale’s forces were, in the context of the Kismayo intervention, refashioned as government forces (ICG 2013; Heritage Institute 2013; IHS Jane 2013), thereby seeking to cast the alliance as an expansion and local enabler of state sovereignty—in reality, a strategy of necessity rather than choice.

In the autumn of 2012, al Shabaab was ousted from Kismayo by this alliance of convenience, whereby international discourse of counterinsurgency ‘turning to the local’ became intimately interlinked with regional geopolitics, national strategies of ‘mediated’ state power, and local struggles over order making and access to coercive resources.

### PERFORMING A ‘POST-AL SHABAAB’ ORDER: NEW COUNTERINSURGENT QUASI-SOVEREIGNS

While the counterinsurgent mobilization against al Shabaab in Kismayo was from the outset entwined with attempts at creating new political structures, soon after the defeat of al Shabaab it became evident that there was no shared vision or viable plan for how or by whom the long contested Jubaland, and Kismayo in particular, should be governed. As a result, the processes that followed came to directly influence the complex struggle over how sovereignty and political power should be enacted, defined, and organized in the Somali context.

Tensions were rising between local clans immediately after the defeat of al Shabaab—in particular between Ogaden and Marehan, who had been fighting with support from Kenya and Ethiopia/FGS, respectively. While the counterinsurgent ‘Jubaland initiative’ initially provided the means for ousting al Shabaab from Kismayo, although not from all of Jubaland, it had also incited trajectories of continuous war within the society through the investment of force in local civil relations.

This revolved around a combination of violent clashes and symbolic performances whereby local elites sought recognition as quasi-sovereign local enablers of what has been framed as ‘bottom-up post-al Shabaab

order' (Freear 2012) in the international counterinsurgency narrative. Attempts of local elites seeking to consolidate their power, to demonstrate 'legitimate' local sovereign authority and to render themselves legible as counterinsurgency allies to prospective international partners drew substantially, as will be shown below, on generic 'state signifiers' such as launching 'elections', declaring 'presidency' and forming governing 'cabinets'. Such signifiers, in turn, have purchase in international discourse on the Somalia 'light footprint model' of 'bottom-up statebuilding' as the best and most legitimate means to strengthen counterinsurgent governance (Pham 2013; Bronwyn 2010; Freear 2012; Kilcullen 2010).

On 15 May 2013, amid a breakdown in negotiations regarding how Jubaland should be governed, Madobe declared himself to be the 'elected president' of Jubaland at an assembly of an estimated 500 leaders of local elites and clans. At the time, Madobe had, with his MRK militia and with Kenyan military support, established armed presence in the area (UN Security Council Report 2013) and already had control over Kismayo. Later the same day, Hiiraale, who had relocated from Mogadishu to Kismayo with his personal Marehan clan militia, also declared himself the 'president' of Jubaland at a separate gathering (*ibid.*; AFP 2013).

In this context of competing 'presidencies', Kenya and Ethiopia each supported their 'candidate'. The FGS, in turn, keen to assert its authority as a sovereign government, and concerned with the increasing powers and agency of local strongmen, claimed that both 'election processes' were unconstitutional and imposed on the local communities by their leaders (IRIN 2013). This withdrawal of FGS support from the 'Jubaland initiative', in turn caused—not unfounded—accusations that the government was returning to attempts of centralizing power (IHS Jane 2013).

Late 2012 and the first half of 2013 marked a period of intense clashes and tensions in Jubaland among local actors as well as between the Somali government and Madobe—the latter continuously supported by the KDF. As the crisis escalated, it was perceived as having the risk of potentially undermining the central government (Heritage 2013). To prevent Madobe and his MRK militia from pursuing a separatist scheme for Jubaland, internationally supported negotiations were launched, which eventually led to the formation of a new political framework for the Jubaland polity.

This illustrates well the intricacies and paradoxes of political power and sovereignty—and the relationship between central and decentralized 'government'—that are being reconfigured as part of counterinsurgency 'going

local'. The Jubaland elite had gained substantially new coercive resources through its participation in new regional-international counterinsurgent alliances, which enabled it to challenge state power and sovereignty. This, somewhat ironically, led to the creation of new, internationally backed governance accords for Jubaland to contain the power of the Jubaland elite, while in effect also, providing the very framework for the latter's decentered quasi-sovereign status.

In August 2013, after negotiations in Addis Ababa, an agreement was signed by Somali Minister of State Farah Sheikh Abdulkadir on behalf of the government and by Madobe on behalf of what became recognized as the 'Interim Juba administration'. According to the UN, the agreement established 'the modalities of administration and governance in the Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo' for an interim period of six months (UN News Centre 2013). In November 2013, the Addis Ababa talks were followed up by what was termed a 'reconciliation conference' in Mogadishu, attended by FGS representatives, representatives of Jubaland's political elite and international actors, including UN officials and the foreign ambassadors to Somalia. This meeting developed further the governance accords, security arrangements, reforms, and plans for demobilization set out in the previous agreement. The agreements were congratulated by the international community, represented by the UN, as a key local building block for establishing good governance and stability in Somalia, and thereby also contributing to international security (Andualem and Khalif 2013).

Little attention had been paid toward providing space for wider reconciliation or for giving voice to Somalis outside the partisan political groupings, so as to reach wider consent among the 'ruled', however. The process, as a result, remained essentially top down and militarized despite claims to the opposite (see below). Against this backdrop, the Addis Ababa agreement met substantial local resistance. Large demonstrations took place in the city of Baidoa, in the neighboring inter-riverine regions, as people protested on the basis that the agreement gave Madobe the right to rule over part of what they considered to be their ancestral land (ICG 2013: 15). With regards to developments inside the Jubaland regions, reports indicated that groups of armed clansmen from the Marchan sub-clan—who came to Kismayo recast as contingents of the Somali federal army to defeat al Shabaab but who did not support Madobe/Ogaden forces—had defected from the government troops and re-entered the militias led by Hiraale to avoid being disarmed in the ongoing disarmament operation and to contest Madobe's leadership.<sup>6</sup>

Notwithstanding such resistance and lack of reconciliation, Madobe, in early December 2013—acting as an extension of the Addis Ababa and Mogadishu negotiations—appointed what became recognized as a ‘new cabinet’ (ICG 2014), which reflected some alliance building in terms of inclusion of selected sub-clans, while it also clearly signified the consolidation of Madobe’s status as Jubaland’s leader, and as such set out ‘a sure route to re-establishing his relevance in the political and economic affairs of Kismayo’ (Atta-Asamoah 2013).

The ‘cabinet’ of Madobe was formally inaugurated in January 2014. A new ‘local’ administration—with its own president and substantial coercive resources—was born. On this occasion, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Nicholas Kay congratulated the roles of the regional powers—the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, AMISOM, and Madobe—and thanked the latter for ‘choosing peace and development and for rejecting war and terrorism’ (Kay 2014). This reiterated the representations of the Jubaland process as a step toward ‘restoring peace in Somalia, building a strong Federal Somalia and contributing to regional and international security’ (Kay quoted by UN News Centre 2013), whereby the creation of Jubaland was depicted as a result of the denunciation of violence, terror, and the cessation of war, and translated into a bottom-up—or dual track —multilateral peace- and statebuilding narrative.<sup>7</sup> As such, the 2011–2013 process of Jubaland’s establishment illustrates the profound ambiguity in regards to interpreting and defining security and ‘political order’ in a context like Somalia. It additionally demonstrates how exactly this ambiguity—allowing for the invocation of elusive yet symbolically powerful signifiers such as ‘federalism’ and ‘bottom-up’ governance and statebuilding—offers legitimizing narratives in regards to the governing of (in)security within the ‘local turn’ in counterinsurgent warfare.<sup>8</sup>

The analysis above, however, suggests that far from conveying how bottom-up peace- and statebuilding initiatives were triumphing over warfare, the 2011–2013 process of establishing the Jubaland administration provides insights into processes at work between war and order making by displaying the role of contemporary counterinsurgency in the organization and production of governing rationales, political order, and decentered non-state sovereignties. This exposes a complex triangulation of security with ‘bottom-up’ peacebuilding and statebuilding frames, placed in the service of contemporary counterinsurgent warfare. It thereby also provides an exemplary illustration of how the ‘schema of war’

can serve as prism for examining internationally and regionally promoted peace and governance accords and policies at work in Somalia and other conflict settings (Bell 2011; Erslev Andersen, this volume) in establishing new frameworks for decentralized political orders and sovereignties, configured according to relations of force reproduced through counter-insurgent warfare.

Such efforts of creating and consolidating new political frameworks for decentered counterinsurgent orders also mark a transition from the targeted momentary instance of counterinsurgency—in this case, the combat against al Shabaab in Kismayo—to longer-term external engagements, or as Bell has put it, fittingly for the Somali case, a ‘transition from interventionary warfare to post-interventionary occupation’ (Bell 2011: 327). This is the focus of the final section below, where it will be demonstrated how the decentering of sovereignty and the creation of the Jubaland polity, following from the counterinsurgent alliances against al Shabaab, have generated a number of overlapping activities relating to new types of missions and forms of geopolitics that sustain external engagement though decentered alliances.

#### FROM INTERVENTIONARY COUNTERINSURGENT WARFARE TO POST-INTERVENTIONARY OCCUPATION

While the Jubaland governance arrangements are, in great part, a product of counterinsurgent alliances and counterinsurgency warfare operating on the logic of decentering sovereignty, the polity’s arrangements themselves subsequently offer new entry points for international and regional actors extending and advancing new ‘missions’ and order-making processes configured around decentered attempts to govern, ‘secure’, and pursue economic interests (see also Kienscherf this volume). Consistent with the aim of creating a more permanent buffer zone, Kenya managed to stay involved, subsequent to the takeover of Kismayo, by still officially operating as part of the internationally supported AMISOM. Somalia analysts have noted that the KDF’s role in the creation and support of the Jubaland administration after the defeat of al Shabaab put Kenya in a position to ‘more or less run Kismayo, and doing so for the money of the international community who funds AMISOM’ (Anderson and Gundel 2013). On this basis, there has also been no strong incentive for Kenya to develop an exit strategy (*ibid*). One aspect of Kenya’s sustained engage-

ment relates to dynamics of regionalism based on partially illicit trade networks. Kismayo port is a nodal point for sugar trade, black market trade, and goods that are shipped in and then transported onwards to Kenya and farther into the East Africa region. Given Kenya's continued presence in Kismayo, as an AMISOM contingent, and given the KDF's decentered alliance with and consolidation of the Jubaland administration/Muaskar Ras Kamboni, Kenya was able to gain substantial control over, and economic benefit from, these circuits of import and export (*ibid.*; UN Security Council Report 2013).

The development of the Jubaland administration has also allowed for the extension of new privatized security networks that, reciprocally, have extended and diversified Jubaland's security infrastructures. This follows a pattern whereby new and emerging quasi-sovereigns and administrations come to serve as entry points for partnerships for private security contractors who connect security provision with the testing of new 'conflict-zone business models'. In the context of Jubaland, the transnational US-based company Atlantean is an illustrative case, whose engagements indicate further the logic of reconfiguring and decentering power and political order through interactions and alliances between non-state actors on both ends of the local-international spectrum. Atlantean is not registered as a legal business with Somali authorities, has no relationship with or authorization from the central government, and has avoided reporting (on, e.g., activities/packaging lists and shipments) to the UN monitoring group. Instead, it has established a partnership directly with the Kismayo Development Authority (UN Security Council Report 2013)—reportedly operating as 'a political extension' (*ibid.*: 351) of Kenya's key counterinsurgency ally, the Muaskar Ras Kamboni militia—which, in turn, became connected with transnational security governance.

Atlantean is advertising its presence and connections in Somalia to oil and gas companies 'with the image of a risk management company' (*ibid.*) that can 'rapidly create operational security, intelligence, and response packages'.<sup>9</sup> As such, the company combines the role of 'locally connected' security/intelligence/counterinsurgency provider with efforts of private investment, also running Camp Kismayo in Jubaland, which caters to 'diplomats, journalists, humanitarian workers and business people seeking a heaven in Kismayo'.<sup>10</sup> Such patterns of proliferating local, regional, international, and transnational alliances in which local groups seek new influence through international or transnational counterinsurgency and security networks, while regional, international, and transnational actors

pursue security governance by evading what is considered ineffective state authority, illustrates in further detail a central pattern also demonstrated in the above sections, namely how post-Westphalian forms of sovereignty are produced through the presence of external actors (in contrast to state sovereignty as a prerogative against interference).

With regards to the US and the wider international community's ongoing counterinsurgency engagements (beyond immediate combat), the discursive interlinking of 'bottom-up capacity building' and 'Western security' remains essential. As polities—such as Jubaland—become represented as part of the 'Somalia that works bottom up' (Pham 2013: 27), continuous engagement can be framed simply as efforts to enable local 'government' and security for local populations: 'For the populous areas of Kismayo and its environs, the dual track policy provides the first real opportunity to drive forward a bottom-up form of government' (Freear 2012). The international and US roles envisioned in this regard allegedly center on 'impartially shepherding' dialogue and political processes while monitoring and supporting the development of a 'local style' 'post-al Shabaab governance' based on 'Somali trends' (ibid.). In fact, in the context of increasing securitization of Somalia, almost every local 'government' and polity have benefitted from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism-driven institution and capacity building while, according to a recent analysis of intervention trends in Somalia, issues of rights and accountability have increasingly taken the back seat (e.g. see Menkhaus 2014).

Interventionary counterinsurgency efforts follow different trajectories—adapting to the different local environments across Somalia—from 'pre-emptive counterinsurgency' in relatively stable contexts like Somaliland (Reno 2015; see also Moe 2015, 2016; Moe and Müller 2015) to intervening actors flexibly navigating, enlisting, and generating mutable local forces, alliances and administrative institutions for executing specific security tasks in the context of ongoing counterinsurgent warfare in the south of Somalia. Such construction of 'bottom-up' forms of counterinsurgent governance and government—in the absence of strong state institutions—signifies governing rationales that go well beyond momentous instances of proxy wars and, rather, demonstrate an engagement in the 'long war' (Marchal 2012) of containment, revolving around building up and maintaining local 'self-securing' counterinsurgency structures, institutions, and quasi-sovereigns.

## CONCLUSION

In focusing on the case of counterinsurgent warfare in Jubaland, this chapter analyzed the order-making productive effects, and ensuing reconfigurations of political power and sovereignty, of counterinsurgency's 'local turn' in Somalia. It was demonstrated how 'light-footprint' counterinsurgency approaches have started to adapt to the limitations of 'standard' state-centered interventionism and the condition of state fragility by, instead, 'decentering sovereignty'—that is to say, by enlisting and producing local 'non-state' actors and decentered 'counterinsurgent polities' with new coercive means.

The external support for local actors and administrations against al Shabaab, including the arming of local militias and building of self-defending quasi-sovereigns, have on some occasions been a means of weakening insurgents' capacity to govern. It, moreover, has empowered local elites by making it possible to position themselves as effective partners in the war against al Shabaab. Nevertheless, it is also evident that this approach, while framed as support for 'bottom-up government', is unlikely to meet the hopes of those who envision possibilities for more localized inclusive forms of political community and security (along the lines of previous Somali trends toward localized representative politics and order 'beyond' the central state, e.g. in Somaliland). Nor is it likely to meet the aspiration of statebuilding advocates who anticipate a government that can protect and provide for its people. Rather, as illustrated by the recent 'test case' of dual-track counterinsurgency, the Jubaland initiative, such decentered, local-international, counterinsurgency alliances are apt to entail further weaponization of local institutions, thereby spurring a long 'everyday' war within the society.

## NOTES

1. A re-representation that contradicts the recent quantitative approach of actually increasing the AMISOM combat troops. As AMISOM was extended by the Security Council in November 2013, its troop ceiling was at the same time increased from 17,731 to 22,126.
2. Along these lines, AMIOSM has received training in complex urban operations, by the transnational security company Bancroft, effectively operating as an adaptive force enabler for the mission (Moe, forthcoming)

3. The dual-track policy was proclaimed by US Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson in October 2010, and remained in place as an official policy until the recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia in 2012. Its key tenets remain central to contemporary intervention and, specifically, to the ‘decentralized’ international efforts to combat al Shabaab.
4. Kenya’s military campaign, dubbed Operation Linda Nchi (translating to ‘protect the country’), purportedly set out to target al Shabaab militants who had kidnapped foreign tourists and aid workers and attacked civilians on Kenyan territory (in Northern and coastal Kenya) (Ainte 2013).
5. The Somali-inhabited Ogaden territory in Ethiopia has long constituted a site of armed political struggle against the Ethiopian government.
6. Well-armed Marehan militias remained in Jubaland and the outskirts of Kismayo, and regularly clashed with the Jubaland forces and the MRK militia. Consistent with wider conflict patterns of shifting alliances and infiltrations, there have also been instances of defection the other way around as some of Hiraale’s Marehan militias have found it more advantageous to join Jubaland forces, recognizing the strength of Madobe and his administration (All Africa Brief 2013).
7. Such a hopeful scenario has, unsurprisingly, at the time of writing, been undermined by continuous power struggles—and in June 2015, a break of the ties—between the SFG and the Jubaland administration.
8. As such, contemporary counterinsurgency/dual track policies also echo earlier proposals of ‘bottom-up approaches’ to interventions in Somalia. For example, in the late 1990s, the so-called building-block approach (encouraging support to start from sub-state administrative structures) was proposed as an alternative to conventional statebuilding (Matt Bryden, ‘New Hope for Somalia? The Building Block Approach’, *Review of African Political Economy* 26, no. 79 2009: 134–40). To be clear, the errand of the present chapter is neither to critique nor to endorse reconstruction efforts starting from the local level governance arrangements, or the pursuit of federalism as a statebuilding strategy in Somalia, but to point to the ways in which counterinsurgent warfare also becomes articulated through such narratives.

9. Atlantean official webpage: <http://atlanteanworldwide.com/riskmanagement/>.
10. Atlantean official webpage: <http://campkismayo.atlanteanworldwide.com/>.

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