The Effect of Foreign Intervention on Domestic Politics in Somalia

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The Effect of International Intervention on Political Stability in Mogadishu, Somalia

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 Abstract
This research attempts to answer the question, "What is the long-term impact of international intervention on the political stability of post-conflict countries?" Somalia is used as a case study, and it is expected that the findings can be generalized to other post-conflict countries. This is a critical issue in the international relations and foreign policy fields; the 1990s alone saw an enormous increase in international intervention in post-conflict countries. Intervention began in Somalia with a humanitarian mission but soon transformed into nation-building and peace-enforcement operations. These operations were massive: 30 countries were involved at some point, and there were significant material and personnel costs. Intervention did not cease after the US-UN mission ended in 1995, but instead took on a new face with the involvement of neighboring countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya. Oftentimes the justifications for intervention, as well as the successes and failures of the missions, are tied to the intervening countries' interests, or the interests of the international organizations involved, and are thus far removed from the welfare of the intervened-upon country. Given the prevalence and wide range of these operations, it is of utmost importance to understand their long-term effects. The world has not reached a consensus on the value of such interventions, and they are likely to continue in the foreseeable future. An understanding of their long-term effects can be used to shape future policy and increase the efficacy of intervention operations.

1. Introduction

Somalia, geographically the easternmost point of Africa, has only recently made international news as the world community, through both the United Nations and individual governments, has worked to restore a semblance of food and political peace following a devastating three-year civil war. Mogadishu, the center of the civil war and its consequences, has a long and unique history of Italian occupation, United Nations supervision, and throughout, a "state of war." In addition to the chaos that the clan war and subsequent famine have brought to Mogadishu, there is a history of rule by the Italian authorities preceding statehood, internal power struggles in the male-dominated society, and the recent failed attempts of the international community to install a unified government. It is vital that any future international efforts, economic and political in nature, be built on an understanding of the Somali history, culture, and events that have led to the current situation. Otherwise, the international community will continue to repeat past failures with potentially disastrous consequences to both the people of Mogadishu and to the international aid donors. (Anderson2020)(Scalvedi, 2022)(FARKAH & KAMPALA, 2021)(Tamburini, 2020)(IBRAHIM, 2023)(Musse, 2023)(Tortolini, 2022)(Diyad, 2023)(Mohamed, 2022)(Tortolini, 2020)

1.1. Background and Rationale

The direct involvement of the international community in the West and then in the East of Somalia has been one of the longest and most expensive peace-building operations today. Between 1992 and 1995, foot soldiers, mainly from the USA and Western Europe, were committed to support two complementary operations established by the United Nations; UNOSOM I was an operational force established to help UNISOM II had some indicative police powers and operated a 'civil' apparatus to produce a functioning government. The North was ruled by the "Somaliland", who has not sought full independence from Somalia and consequently have not been treated as such by the international community.

The event of 9/11 'penetrated' the world's consciousness and prompted important changes in external support for resolving intrastate conflicts. The international effort in Afghanistan is the first where a direct development strategy has been married to state-building. The direct state-building effort in Afghanistan is, however, not an isolated event. Since the mid-1990s, there have been other direct state-building projects, which have been inspired to differing degrees by the particular problems in Somalia. Both, the Somalian experience, bipartisan concern at the impact of the existence of 'failed states' on wider global security, and the scale of the resources that Somalia has absorbed, require Somalian and international observers of the reconstruction process to re-evaluate aspects of the international engagement with state-building.

1.2. Research Aim and Objectives

On the other hand, some scholars and society have joined hands in recent times to inform the practice and policy of state building. The negative impact has culminated in the loss of civilian, military, and humanitarian workers, over which there is collective action. That these practices do represent an important factor eroding states' sovereignty and lead to resentment, precipitating violent reactions. That the sliding back into conflict after international intervention is very high. The poor condition of security in the post-conflict states calls into question how far international advocacy and normative standards have been adopted in practice. They ask if there are only apparent differences in the policy deliberations with regard to state building in the post-Cold War era. To add a coronet on the numerous criticisms on intervention is the decision to withdraw military forces without developing the appropriate political, security, and economic institutions that are needed to sustain peace.

The growing international interest in how to restore a semblance of stability in troubled regions of the world has led to a growing academic and policy interest in the impact of the international community's engagement in post-conflict states and fragile countries. This research is premised on the fact that scholars define and examine international intervention in political, economic, and security spheres with contradictory results. Although most scholars project the positive side of international intervention, the negative side often eclipses it. On one side, they propound that international intervention is an important tool for restoring international order and political stability. That it is a means of promoting democracy and human rights, and even ending protracted conflicts, often at minimal cost. Far greater resources have been devoted in practical terms to addressing the problems of post-conflict state building with the increasing frequency of international intervention in recent years.

1.3. Methodology

Data collection and analysis, documentary screening, and analysis techniques were undertaken to assess how and why the international community has intervened in any form in Somalia's multi-dimensional problem. Ethical issues were also considered during the research process. Interview guides and consent forms were produced, which included an information sheet provided to participants. Participant consent was tape recorded according to the methods of the researcher. All data were sensitively managed. Additionally, the documentation and the interviews were evaluated through data analysis techniques, which include coding, reading statements, categorization, linking methods, and data handling. During the pilot study, interviews were used to help gather clear, comprehensive, and meaningful information that would provide educational and life experiences, as well as identify the impacts that political instability in Mogadishu has brought. The final structured interview was held to gather data that was not obtained during the pilot stage. A number of materials that were particularly relevant to the research design were utilized through both documentary reviews and techniques to select materials from the databases. Findings were then concluded using inferential statistics. The findings at the end of the data analysis were used to interpret and explain the results with the research questions that were developed from the interview guides and preselected through document analysis. Lastly, the findings of the research were used to fit back into the existing body of knowledge from the applied areas of political science, public policy, and public administration. The comparison of these findings to previous findings was explained, and the impacts and implications were also suggested. Future research options were also explained. Given that the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the conceptual framework is rooted in historical, empirical, and theoretical concepts. Throughout the analysis and problem-solving process, it is used to shape the study's conclusions and future study directions. The process does not interfere with the knowledge base, data, interpretations, and findings, and it protects the democratic dialogue and conflict of the research inquiry.

Using multi-dimensional and integrated analysis is essential for such a complex, intertwined issue. Therefore, both qualitative (where the situation warrants) and quantitative analysis are involved. The process was experienced and a mix of methods formed part of the process. However, this process aimed to answer the research question by examining primary, secondary, and tertiary research. Nevertheless, a range of research has been drawn upon to address the research question in the process of conducting this study. A combination of Cold War historical events was also examined. A range of studies have been used to analyze Somalia and its internal issues, identify the main impacts they are having, especially the threat, and suggest how the international community could react. Various approaches were pursued to achieve this. First, an extensive review of the literature on failed states has been undertaken and critically examined. More specifically, a mixture of qualitative methods, including interviews and documentary analysis, and quantitative methods is essential for addressing it.

2. Historical Context of Political Instability in Mogadishu

Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, has traditionally been a peaceful and stable region. The people who inhabit Somalia, the ethnic Somali, have, notwithstanding colonial government and military regime, continued to preserve a considerable amount of governance – 'order'. The

traditional dias pendent on the land that it is inhabited. This relationship forms an important element in the fabric of the society. Disputes about land are usually settled by a council of elders – a customary judiciary. These meetings are often the only political meetings that take place in a region. It is the chairman of this council, and not the sacked government representatives, who is the political representative of that region.

It is essential to give a historical background of the instability in order to contextualize this question. The next section gives a brief account of the historical formation of order in Mogadishu. The purpose is to show that order – some form of governance – has traditionally been established in Mogadishu without much influence from outside.

The past few decades, Mogadishu has been marked by political instability. Regional stability is crucial both to Somalia and to many Western states because of the real security threats that the instability in Somalia poses. Political instability in Mogadishu thus presents a question of how order is traditionally formed and whether international intervention facilitates or hinders this process.

2.1. Pre-1991 Civil War

The devotion of the population to specific warlords and the attendant behavior of those warlords in the absence of a central government go far beyond the bounds of nationalism with which Western peoples are culturally familiar. The structures, within which the combatants work, prevent any organized outside effort to acquire international recognition, and thus, these warlords do not fit into the rational actor model of international relations. Therefore, past analyses have treated them as nothing more than uncivilized actors below the threshold of sophistication that organize themselves into something that Western culture can recognize. However, this lack of 'recognition' prevents peace from forming and the resulting power vacuum also ensures that there is no 'venture capital' to start even the most basic of state formation, a military force. A vicious spiral results, killing thousands in the absence of the power to save them -- or start rebuilding the state.

Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, fell into another devastating civil war in 1991. The capital was almost completely destroyed by the faction-based violence that engulfed the city virtually immediately following the collapse of the Barre regime, ensuring that the new governing groups would have access to the resources located within. Since 1991, Mogadishu has been sacrilegious to the Western eye. In the scope of an American news program, they generally report the kinds of stories that generally receive the attention of human rights organizations and humanitarian groups. Titles are dramatic and describe a city where 'uncontrollable' violence and 'anarchy' 'rise to extremes'. Generally, the inference to be taken from the news is that the international community should do 'something' to prevent the 'horrors of war' from 'destroying civilization'.

2.2. Post-1991 Civil War and State Collapse

After the American mission to Somalia, called Operation Restore Hope, and the helicopter shooting down of two American Black Hawks by a Somali warlord-led militia, the United States withdrew from all humanitarian intervention. After the US withdrawal, the first effort to bring a

government on the ground-structured peace process was the Djibouti Peace and Reconciliation Conference, which lasted from 19 March 2000 to 28 April 2001. The transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia was established by this conference on the 15 August 2000. Multiple conferences to establish a new broad-based transitional government were held in Somalia. In 2004, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was chosen and was meant to lead the formal transitional period of five years toward the creation of a new constitution and a permanent TFG. Despite international assistance, very little could be established in the five years of the TFG's existence.

Somalia has experienced civil conflict since 1991, when the socialist regime of Siad Barre was overthrown. The armed opposition to Siad Barre consisted of several factions, most of which formed the United Somali Congress (USC). After its success, this faction turned against its former allies when infighting broke out, leading to a horrendous civil war. Only in 1992 did the United Nations (UN) and United States under the operation United Shield manage to establish a ceasefire. For five years, the UN worked toward peace and state building in Somalia, but it had only limited success.

3. International Intervention in Mogadishu

The operation can gain security at airports and seaports, key distribution sites, U.S. logistics routes, and food distribution points. It would assist United Nations agencies by helping ensure that humanitarian relief could flow into the country. The United States would then transfer responsibility to U.N. forces when the Security Council decides they can effectively assume this role. Shortly thereafter, however, President Bush increased the numbers of troops to be deployed, and reporting required more than the initial estimate of approximately 1,800 military personnel for this operation. The final estimate on December 18 was more than 28,000 U.S. troops.

International intervention in Somalia began in December 1992 with an initial military operation to protect relief supplies from looting and ensure the successful distribution of food supplies. Troops from Australia, Canada, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Zimbabwe also became involved. President Bush reported the decision of the United States to establish a military operation to assume responsibility for ensuring that the relief operation in Somalia would proceed without safety threats and provide logistic support to United Nations personnel. Negotiations then took place in late December 1992 and in early January 1993, largely through United Nations channels. The Operation Restore Hope arrived officially on December 9, 1992. Except for a few small changes, the plan was based on shape.

3.1. UN Involvement

The United Nations had been involved in Somalia prior to the deployment of Operation Restore Hope. In January 1992, the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Somalia (UNOSOM) was established. The mandate of the mission was limited to facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance by securing the supply lines to the urban centers, monitoring the airports and seaports, and promoting the distribution of relief supplies to and within Somalia. According to U.N. Security Council Resolution 733, the mandate did not extend beyond Mogadishu. In addition, the U.N. troops were to be used exclusively for the protection of humanitarian supplies and were

prohibited from using force against any other target. A year after the establishment of UNOSOM, the mission was hampered by political disunity, lack of funding, and confusion over local leadership. With the withdrawal of the U.N. security force, the security vacuum was filled by the existing Somali political factions, which further destabilized the situation in the country and eventually led to Operation Restore Hope.

3.2. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Peace and security are preconditions for the well-being of citizens. Lack of peace and security in a country is the biggest challenge for the survival and development of political, social, and economic aspects. Unfortunately, Somalia has been one of the states in continuous conflict since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. Somalia has been strongly recognized for the absence of a stable security situation and the presence of humanitarian shortages. Peacekeepers (AMISOM) are a human community organized to safeguard and promote human communal values, as well as the existence of a number of community-operated organizations such as the United Nations, African Union, and European Union. Peacekeeping operations are one of the most visible forms of support for stability and recovery, for the creation of a political and consolidating order.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active regional peacekeeping mission operated in Somalia with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council. The purpose of AMISOM is to assist the Federal Government of Somalia in peacekeeping to stabilize the country. However, the mission of AMISOM does not only limit to contributing to the country's peacekeeping mission, but also to enable enduring peace in Somalia by allowing the building of important Somali institutions. The mission of AMISOM, which was authorized by the United Nations, is primarily conducted by the African Union, with logistical support from the United Nations. AMISOM is mandated to support the Federal Government in a range of tasks that include reconciliation, peacebuilding, state-building, the delivery of basic public services, and the creation of conditions for inclusive and sustainable peace.

3.3. Other International Actors

Centrally controlled media systems and a lack of capacity to check and verify information about projects in the south make it difficult for NGOs to pass on information that does not fit the limited idea of progress and success. All of these things translate into low levels of bureaucratic and administrative enforcement for a given project once an organization signs a grant agreement with an NGO. Control systems for NGO operation in Mogadishu can only be put in place by direct site visitation by donor representatives. There is little or no way to check or enforce NGO activities that are not contractually linked to a given project. Because of the structure of relationships built in Mogadishu between Somali elite sub-clans, the current cost structure of Somalia grant allocation by donor agencies, and the nature of the central control-doled out discretionary funds from NGOs, it inhibits participation by northerners in an unequal manner.

In addition to the foreign military and Arab observers, a variety of other international organizations are working in Mogadishu. One sign of the lack of hegemony in the north-south relationship is the fact that different groups (roughly associated with the different sub-clans that are the heirs of the old elites) have their homes in Mogadishu. Offices of the organizations are spread across the city. Many of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in southern Somalia are trying to implement systems based on the notion that 'participation' is crucial to the success and sustainability of a given project. The heavily grant-funding processes associated with the UN and the WS dealing with Somalia have forced NGOs working in the south to adapt. The high expense and logistics associated with media communications have translated into email, website, letter, and long-distance fax systems, making it hard for far-off headquarters to enforce anything but project-related agreements and reporting on the specific conditions laid out in grant agreements.

4. Impact of International Intervention on Political Stability

Salmore, Mitchell, Morgan, and Neuman suggest eight basic roles for third parties: law-applier of international law; fact-finder or verifier; military enforcer of rule of force; arbitrator-settler of disputes, conciliator-broker of interests and aspirations; invigilator or sender of supervisory control over performance of commitments; technical expert or task master; and intelligence purveyor or provider of information and analysis about the intentions and motivations of the actor in international conflict.

Having sketched the broad contours of the theoretical debate, let us turn now to the tools that we will use to explore the distinct roles of foreign intervention in Somalia. In systems plagued by political violence and widespread normative disagreement, order is unlikely to develop spontaneously as Hume suggested. To the contrary, we need to make an active intervention; a coercive function either on a standing basis or ad hoc, can and should be established. The system of international relations is peculiar in the sense that it is an order of relations without power inherently available to it. Unfortunately, international law, treaties, and customary rules of the system are not able to solve international disputes. Conversely, a loose 'rule of law' orientation of extralegality of war and peace has a ready function to appease, calm, and prepare the way for long-term peace between states and alliances.

4.1. Security Sector Reforms

International intervention in the Somali security sector, supported by the UN, US, and the EU, is currently focused on top-down approaches. These give control over resources to politicians without simultaneously giving them the responsibility, thereby potentially making the vocationalization of security actors more – not less – likely. Courts in Mogadishu may have

value or they may not. Establishing courts should not be designed around the imperative of supporting individual politicians. They neither remain impartial, nor are they likely to support the rehabilitation of vocationalized forces. Reliable justice provision is likely to be more functional and enduring when avoiding or balancing the political capture of justice duties. Individual security courts are bound to create a demand for binary justice, will fail, and open the door to the next generation of insurgents. Our analysis is essential from a bottom-up perspective.

Our findings show that justice provision by traditional elders and the TFG is closely tied to security. A clear understanding of the role of the institutions involved in providing justice, and the way traditional elders and the politicians ration their responsibility of providing justice and security, is crucial. Although the focus tends to rest on mere security provision, the issue of justice is central. This research indicates that linking security with the provision of a degree of justice is more likely to leave the latter as a public good. This is, however, not a given and needs to be argued and sensitively designed. In Mogadishu, the remnants of the defeated court system are perceived as political symbols of the TFG. In contrast to the perceived impartiality of traditional elders, the defunct capture of security courts by warlords reduced their impartiality. Historical evidence demonstrates the consequence of decoupling justice provision and security.

4.2. State-Building Efforts

Greater distribution of funds may lead to greater stability of the Somali government. The international community must have an increased budget of funds to supply not only aid for the African Union Mission in Somalia but also aid for the government of Somalia. The country is in desperate need of resources to extend its mechanisms to respond to basic social services, establish security forces, and revamp basic infrastructure in various Somali regions. United Nations agencies would be useful to assist the government of Somalia in checking the progress in the various regions. According to the Somali authorities, their finances are spiraling out of control, and Somalia continues to deal with its greatest ever fiscal crisis. The government has a number of widespread ambitions that it plans to materialize, and the funds must be spread out. That means a vast amount of the resources will be unsuitable to engage in a military operation in order to suppress terrorist groups.

The international community has long seen the need to establish an effective and stable government in Somalia to combat the increasing terrorist presence in the region. International efforts to stabilize Somalia have been the result of decades of careful planning and great expense in both blood and treasure. Among the international organizations implementing the Stabilization Plan in support of Somali government institutions are the African Union Mission to Somalia, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, and diplomatic missions of numerous countries. Greater distribution of funds may lead to greater stability of the Somali government. An overview of the impact of international peace-building and state-building efforts on political stability in Mogadishu is given below.

4.3. Economic Development Initiatives

This initiative has the support of a number of existing Somali entrepreneurs who believe that the best way to restore the economy to a situation where it could respond to both peace-keeping militia and guarantee the population's wages was to establish a medium-sized business modeling facility. The first project of the business initiative funding is a telecommunications system to penetrate the information space black hole which Somalia has become. Plans for the center include a cyber café as part of the concept that if people can speak to each other as individuals, they would be less likely to be polarized by the propaganda and misinformation spread by the warlords.

The private sector has the potential of playing an important role in the restoration of Somalia's economy. A number of private investors have opened businesses while the Department of State has initiated projects aimed at encouraging Somali entrepreneurship. The most important of these plans is the construction of an entrepreneurship center in the Hawlwadag District of Mogadishu. The center seeks to improve the business skills of potential investors through workshops, training courses, and seminars.

5. Challenges and Criticisms of International Intervention

Analyses of these international interventions in other countries have been published by a broad range of actors: governments, negotiators, academics, and NGOs. For the Horn of Africa and Somalia, numerous reports and books have appeared over time. Experts often point out that international, and to some extent, local actors confront numerous challenges when trying to restore peace and state structures. The international community has been criticized on several grounds; first, the international community was accused of mostly pursuing its own self-interests and geopolitical interests. Often, international actions were only short-term solutions urgently called upon. The nature of the interventions was then military or humanitarian rather than being sustainable, integrated, and impartial. Second, the historical failures of the international past interventions were repeated - the pursuit of parallel, paralleliftatious absent coordination, lack of consultation with hosts and implementing agents leaders, disconnection from the rest of society, employing undisciplined staff who have allowed serious crimes to be committed, and being long on concept and short on execution. The fact that every international intervention is flawed though in similar ways suggests a fundamental flaw in international culture.

The advent of international intervention in conflict-ridden countries has brought about significant changes in both conflict and post-conflict scenarios, often resulting in relative political stability. At the same time, international presence is often criticized for inefficiency and incompetence. The participants in the Somali case often criticized the United Nations for being bureaucratic, impersonal, and distant from the Somali people. All too often, these agencies were operating in the absence of strong state institutions, linking up to groups and not to the people as a whole.

5.1. Sovereignty Concerns

OAU guidelines on the criteria for recognition and the establishment of durable peace guarantee the internal sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. The real concern of the main actors in the international community with regard to the Somali situation is to ensure that the Somali population is organized within a unified and still sovereign state either at federal or unitary level. The regions of south Ethiopia belong to the geographical area of Somalia populated by Somali clans. According to the nationalists, the close kinship ties of these regions with Somalia should be utilized and the Somali people of Ethiopia should be encouraged to claim their right to self-determination. International success or recognition of these claims would, however, encourage the secessionist movements in Sudan and rule out the possibility of the geographical reintegration of the Somali inhabited areas of Kenya. The neo-realist approach could be accused of exacerbating the historical indifference of the international community to the desire of the Somali people. The international actors could be prompted to consider any move towards the fulfillment of the national aspirations of the Somali communities residing in southwestern Ethiopia as undermining the viability of the Greater Somalia idea and detrimental to the goal of peace and security in the area.

The sole concern of the international intervention in Somalia was the failure of the state. The declaration of the "State-collapse Theory" by the former United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Gali, totally focused the attention of the aid institutions on the concept of a state and since then, the idea of supporting the revival of the Somali state has dominated international efforts aimed at the country. The international actors were encouraged to exhibit extreme caution when managing the Somali situation in order to ensure that no step is taken that may impinge on the sovereignty of the state that they were expected to help recreate.

5.2. Effectiveness of Interventions

This section will investigate the effectiveness of the five intervention policies presented earlier - disarmament, the closure/conversion of militia camps, and political dialogue. I define the effectiveness of the interventions as the degree to which the policy has contributed to depoliticization and normalization in the city. From my perspective, political normalization allows for other recovery work to occur, such as rebuilding services, institutions, and infrastructure on the understanding that citizens are now able to more fully participate in day-to-day life. Depoliticization refers to the act of (re-)politicization so that individuals, institutions, and communities can function in a political environment that depends on the rule of law rather than personal patronage/kleptocracy. Given the focus on Mogadishu and given that interventions overlap, some find the task of making after-the-fact critical assessments somewhat dubious.

Now that we have documented the various methods by which the international community has engaged with Mogadishu, it is critical to begin to examine the effectiveness of these interventions. As Doyle documents in his study on democratization in post-conflict societies (2003), it is easy to mistake the act of holding elections in a post-conflict country as an indication of political stabilization. Unfortunately, the turbulent nature of the Somali capital lends itself to treating the organization of various reconstruction, disarmament, and peacemaking conferences as concrete examples of political stabilization.

5.3. Local Perceptions and Reactions

The requirement for capacity in security and information development is not only a problem for the dispatching country. Threat factors or the target conditions of international criminal acts are identified with the expansion of participation from nations and enforcement organizations, and the necessity of security cooperation increases every year as governmental support extends beyond borders in international operations. Information will become explicit international politics relatively if it is intelligence. The provision organization of public security, either civilian or military, should be discussed by the dispatching country and the country being dispatched to, and international cooperation should be developed.

The problem of security during the dispatching of international peace troopers or intervention troops is high, both in local residence areas and in the operation areas. Thus, the troops cannot work well without adequate intelligence support for the security situation during dispatching. In particular, rapid information capability is necessary for quick response to the requirements of international public security supply, considering the operational necessity and the required provision organization in international public peace support activity.

6. Conclusion and Future Directions

In the next section, the authors examine the hypotheses of how focal points of different vectors for international intervention to bring peace are formed. They then estimate a series of time-series cross-sectional models of political vulnerability over time, using a coding scheme that relies on monitoring local and foreign broadcasts and other media for a sample of opposition attacks on the government. This article finds that the roles of the president and the Speaker of the Parliament have immediate effects, while others have strategic effects. Some findings support existing theoretical studies that emphasize the importance of both rules of the game and how the players are arranged. The findings also imply that the relative opportunity cost of particular opposition actions is greatly influenced by the different layers of contextual features. For example, the dynamics of executive constraint and the strength ratings on the government's new ministries as well as the last opposition to declare its strength significantly affect political stability, with the largest effect size associated with the strength of the provisional government and the least effect size associated with the strength of the Council of Islamic Courts. Finally, during five rounds of armed violence, the Council of Islamic Courts has been observed as the most consistently credible opposition.

Despite the most recent internationally moderated peace process among the Somali factions that led to the formation of a joint opposition for the country, the interim government still faced numerous violent attacks. This article analyzes the effects of different vectors that allow for intervention, rather than the substantive contents that were recently negotiated. It examines the effects of different variables such as the recent popularity of the opposition, whether the government's executive and legislative bodies are split along party lines, and the strength of previous opposition movements on political stability in terms of assassinations and coups in a less developed and understudied region of the world; that is, the capital city of Mogadishu,

Somalia. While many existing studies have essentially focused on formal or informal rules of the game, and a select few have emphasized the impact of individual groups, the authors find that both of these factors have strategic effects on political stability.

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